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This Article examines whether corporations should owe fiduciary 
duties to its preferred stockholders as preferred stockholders across 
all settings of preferred stock holding. In one context, sophisticated 
venture capitalists purchase preferred stock after carefully 
negotiating the stock price, control over the corporate governance, 
and other key stipulations by contract. Additionally, because the 
initial preferred stockholder could protect its interests through 
staged financing or board control, the preferred stockholder might 
not discount the stock even if it lacked protection since the other 
protective devices made the lack of such protections 
inconsequential so the initial holders won’t pay for these added 
fiduciary protections.  In such settings it does not make sense for 
the corporation to owe fiduciary duties to the preferred stockholders 
as preferred.  In fact, doing so rearranges the basis on which the 
initial stockholders purchased the stock and implying a fiduciary 
term constitutes a hit to the common stockholders and thus ignores 
the terms of the claimants and the risk and targeted return for each 
of them. However, while it makes sense for sophisticated venture 
capitalists to rely only on bargained-for contractual protections, this 
Article identifies two specific contexts where a limited fiduciary 
obligation should be extended to preferred stockholders who lack 
bargaining power. The first is when non-working children are given 
preferred stock in a family business. The second is when a 
corporation takes on a new unfamiliar product line, allowing 
common stockholders to wipe out the value of publicly traded 
preferred stock. When the preferred stock is purchased in the public 
marketplace, the preferred stockholders will not have any 
bargaining power in the preferred stock’s contractual arrangement. 
Moreover, the additional terms routine in shareholder agreements 
between VC’s and founders are almost never found in the Charter 
documents, so those provisions won’t be transferable.  To the 
subsequent purchaser of preferred stock the lack of such protections 
might call for a limited fiduciary duty if the markets for preferred 
stock are not as efficient as for common stock or if there are chinks 
in the efficient capital market hypothesis. Where the disciplining 
effects of the market are weaker, subsequent buyers of the preferred 
stock may not price the stock accurately to reflect the lack of 
 Page 3 
transferable protections, providing a justification for a limited 




When conflicts between preferred and common stockholders 
arise, the key inquiry is whether the preferred stockholders must 
depend exclusively on the contractual protections that they have 
negotiated1 or whether they should be protected by a fiduciary duty 
that goes beyond the fiduciary duty owed to all equity holders.2  
Of course, in the ordinary course when the company is 
making money, the terms of the preferred stockholder will be 
honored.3 Absent a steady-state norm of paying preferred 
stockholders across a wide section of companies, there would no 
market for preferred stock and those preferring less risk than that 
offered by common stock would invest in debt rather than preferred 
stock. Conflicts between preferred and common stockholders only 
arise in the aberrant case where the company is declining in value 
and does not have enough money to satisfy obligations to the 
preferred and the common. 
In these aberrant cases Delaware courts have resolved that 
preferred stockholders must depend exclusively on those 
contractual protections and cannot rely on courts to imply fiduciary 
                                                 
± Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law. Professors 
Ronald J. Coffey, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Charles R. Korsmo, and David P. 
Porter provided valuable insights. Kathleen Harvey (C.W.R.U. J.D. 2016) and 
Daniel Wolfe (C.W.R.U. J.D. 2018) provided superb research assistance. Robert 
Myers is a librarian expert at sleuthing every source imaginable. Errors remain 
mine alone.  
1 The bundle of contractual rights, privileges and limitations are contained in the 
Stock Purchase Agreement; they comprise additional covenants not found in the 
express shares.  
2 Some commentators see the dual roots of the preferred in both corporate law 
and contract causes the law to “vacillate.” See William W. Bratton and Michael 
L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1816, 1820 (2013). 
However, this Article differs from that and finds that the results largely make 
sense and are consistent with a cost minimizing, wealth maximizing approach to 
firm value.  
3 As Bratton and Wachter explain, “In this case [upside], the venture impresses 
the market and proceeds to an initial public offering (IPO). …The venture 
capitalist’s counterparty, the ‘entrepreneur’ shares the jackpot and resumes 
control of the company….” Id. at 1875. 
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obligations in their favor.4 There is one exception; when the 
preferred are not invoking their preferential, contractual rights, the 
preferred “are entitled to the same fiduciary duties as common 
shareholders.”5  
This contractual approach to preferred stockholders has 
provoked varied reactions among commentators. Some allege that 
the preferred are vulnerable and oppressed and require additional 
fiduciary protections.6 Others embrace the categorical approach 
denying all fiduciary protection to the preferred regardless of 
whether the preferred or common control the board of directors.7  
This Article argues that instead of using one approach for all 
cases involving preferred stockholders, either protecting all 
preferred stockholders through or denying protection to all 
preferred stockholders who are not protected by contract, courts 
should instead differentiate and modulate the rule depending on the 
circumstances in which the preferred stock is issued.  This Article 
argues that there can be no one size fits all solution to the fiduciary 
duty issue for the preferred stockholder.8  
In some settings of venture capital where the preferred can 
easily arrange their transactions to avoid adverse outcomes either 
through contract, staged financing, discounted market pricing or 
                                                 
4 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A. 2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
5 See Melissa M. McEllin, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to 
Shareholder Rights, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 895, 908 (2010). See e.g., 11 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5295 n.3.50 suggesting an equitable approach to 
rights preferred share with common stockholders. See Gradient OC Master Ltd. 
V. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104 (Del.Ch. 2007). But see STEPHEN 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATIONS (2015) (suggesting that subsequent “supreme court 
precedents [in Delaware] suggest that all of the rights of preferred stockholders 
are contractual…not just those relating to preferential rights….” Id. at 255. 
6 Lawrence Mitchell would do so by “incorporating a fairness notion into 
directors’ decisionmaking” to “provide preferred shareholders with meaningful 
fiduciary rights.” See also Lawrence Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of 
Preferred Stock and Why We Should Care About It, 51 BUS. LAW. 443, XXX 
(1996).See Melissa M. McEllin, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to 
Shareholder Rights, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 895, 924 (2010).  
7 Charles Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
1163, 1166 (2013).         
8 The law itself does not differentiate between different types of preferred 
stockholders.  
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other protective strategies, a single analysis should be used to 
determine whether to imply a fiduciary duty or some other term in 
an exchange transaction.9 A legal adjudicator should only imply 
fiduciary protection if doing so will minimize total costs10 and 
maximize the “long-run value of the firm.”11 In determining whether 
the ultimacy of increased gains from trade at the lowest cost will be 
achieved by a particular legal intervention, the adjudicator must 
confront assumptions about reality,12 address the use of private 
strategies that may be more cost effective than  legal intervention,13 
consider the reform effects on future parties subject to the legal 
                                                 
9 The same analysis should govern whether courts add terms in other settings 
such as adding implied terms in the contractual setting. For an application of the 
analysis developed in this article in Contract, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy 
for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What to Do When 
Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 323.  
10 This analysis of judicial intervention therefore begins with the nature, 
function and dynamics of exchange, and the ultimacy to be achieved by 
exchange. Cost minimization objectives in exchange transactions explain why 
parties adopt the arrangements they do. See OLIVER. E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING (1985). In some instances the costs savings from adding a term 
may be less than other types of costs that would be generated by the addition so 
the added term would not be efficient. 
11 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function, 2010 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 33 (endorsing 
this objective as the appropriate framework for corporate decision-making). A 
similar analysis is used to determine whether to imply default rules in 
contractual contexts. “Courts should decide whether legal intervention will 
increase gains from trade by projecting what consequences, both ex ante and ex 
post, legal intervention will produce.” See Kostritsky, supra note 9.  
12 Assumptions about reality include fundamental characteristics such as 
bounded rationality and opportunism and the likely incentive effects of certain 
legal rules. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM FIRMS, MARKETS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 44-52 (discussing 
the traits of “contractual man”) (1985).  
13 Stewart Macaulay did pioneering work on contexts in which “legal sanctions 
are often unnecessary and may have undesirable consequences.” Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AMER. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963) reprinted in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS 
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY ON THE EMPIRICAL AND LYRICAL 
(Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford eds., 2013). Macaulay explored why “[i]n most 
situations contract is not needed” since parties resort to other ways to solve 
problems. Id. at 12. 
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intervention, and calculate the offsetting costs of legal 
intervention.14 
One cost from supplying a fiduciary obligation to the 
preferred and implying additional protections after the fact, is that 
there would be an immediate hit to the other claimant, the common 
stockholder, since the agent, the board, now owes an additional 
obligation to the preferred not bargained for. Another cost and thus 
another potential downside to an implied fiduciary protection for 
the preferred is that doing so increases uncertainty and can thus 
destabilize voluntary arrangements and delicately balanced systems 
of incentives that the court does not understand. 15 Since the 
claimants have made their investments based on certain risks and 
the price of the stock reflected those risks, including the lack of 
implied fiduciary protections except those shared with the 
common,16 adding such protections after the fact would alter the 
essential terms of the deal and would not be cost minimizing as a 
legal strategy. Thus, even if one accepts that venture capital 
contracts are incomplete17 since “preferred stock certificates are by 
nature short and incomplete,”18 there is no reason that preferred 
stockholders in venture capital contexts have omitted anything that 
was important to them or if there are omissions, they have priced 
their shares to reflect the lack of specific contractual provisions, 
perhaps through a higher dividend. In either case, adding 
protections in such contexts would not be value maximizing. This is 
particularly true in the context of venture capital preferred stock or 
other sophisticated investor contexts because once an adverse 
decision to the preferred is rendered, a protective provision will 
become universal in the industry.19 
                                                 
14 If offsetting costs outweigh the benefits, it would be perverse to intervene. 
15 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1167. 
16 See supra note 1. 
17 Bratton & Wachter supra note 2, at 1857 (noting that incompleteness of 
preferred stockholders’ contracts renders them vulnerable to board 
opportunism). 
18 McEllin, supra note 4, at 910. 
19 Interview with M & A Lawyer. This is because once the decision is known, it 
would be hard to imagine a founder, for example, in the preferred stock venture 
capitalist sector saying to the investor: See also PREFERRED STOCK: 
RESPONSES TO RECENT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS, Presented by the 
American Bar Association Business Law Section and Center for Professional 
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Moreover, if the investments of the preferred and common 
stock claimants are viewed through a principal/agent lens, then all 
stockholders take the risk that the agent, who represents dual classes 
of stock and is tasked with maximizing the value of the firm, might 
take actions from time to time that hurt one claimant and help 
another claimant so long as the action was “value neutral or more 
than value neutral for the firm.” 20 To the extent that such shifts in 
wealth are anticipated, protections can be implemented by the 
preferred, once again suggesting that law-supplied terms for such 
preferred stockholders would not maximize wealth.  
However, the ability of the preferred to protect themselves 
by contract or other private strategies will vary widely. This 
suggests that a different legal approach that does not uniformly 
relegate preferred to the contractual protections might be 
appropriate.  
In some contexts, such as public preferred stock relegating 
the preferred to a contractual solution or another private solution 
such as board control or a discount stock purchase, may not be 
feasible for large classes of preferred.  In these cases, where the 
common controlled board might either intentionally elect to injure 
the preferred or engage in an outrageous or reckless investment 
strategy 21 that would only be rational when viewed exclusively 
from the perspective of the common and would be viewed as 
grossly irrational by a prudent investor. Thus, a limited fiduciary 
protection for the preferred that rules out reckless investment should 
be implied. In such cases, even if the board’s duty is to maximize 
the long term wealth of the entity, there is some board action that is 
so reckless that no reasonable person would have taken the action 
and the board should not be immunized from liability. If no duty to 
the preferred is implied in such cases, the incentive to invest as 
preferred stockholders may be significantly dampened.  
                                                                                                             
Development (detailing contractual protections for preferred stock that respond 
to recent court decisions).  
20 See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Rights Assignments, 
Firm Detriment, and the Agent’s Performance Obligation, 13 CAN. U. S. L. J. 
155, 181 n.64 (1988). 
21 See Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943) (citing 
"reckless indifference to the rights of others") See Julian Velasco, How Many 
Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2010) 
(discussing “the fact that courts generally do reserve the right to review the 
substance of business decisions, at least in the most extreme cases.”) 
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Moreover, in many contexts even if the preferred wanted to 
bargain for protection against reckless behavior, and even if they 
had the clout to extract a promise against such behavior (an unlikely 
scenario where in many contexts where the preferred have zero 
clout) structural barriers prevent the preferred from acting since the 
party that contracts with the preferred holders through selling 
shares, the firm, is not the perpetrator or beneficiary of the wrongful 
behavior. Further, neither the common stock nor the directors are in 
privity with the preferred. So there is reason to think that a 
contractual solution is not feasible and that adding protection 
against reckless behavior would be consistent with maximizing 
value since retaining a right to act recklessly does not maximize 
firm value. 
Another context in which the ordinary rules relegating 
preferred to their contractual solution involves a family business in 
which preferred is issued to certain family members who play an 
inactive role in a company founded by a parent and common stock 
is issued to the children playing an active role in management. The 
argument that no duties should be owed to those who purchased on 
the assumption that they would be afforded no protection beyond 
the contractual terms seems to make no sense at all since in such 
contexts, where the preferred are gifted preferred stock, they did not 
negotiate the terms of their investment. Moreover, the key argument 
against implying terms—that it causes a hit to the other (common) 
stockholders—has less power here where the other (common) 
stockholders were given their stock by a parent and thus did not 
have their investment devalued by the imposition of additional 
burdens.  
Thus, this Article will argue that the general rule relegating 
preferred exclusively to contractual protections should not govern 
all instances of preferred stockholding but should depend on the 
context in which the stock is issued. Previous commentators have 
treated all preferred stockholders as a class without differentiating 
between the different contexts involving preferred stock. This 
omission has caused many commentators to overstate the 
vulnerability of preferred and to advocate for protective strategies 
for all classes of preferred. However, the ability of preferred varies 
significantly in different contexts and that circumstances requires a 
more nuanced approach to preferred shareholder protection.  
Section I will lay out the general circumstances that warrant 
an implied fiduciary duty in the corporate context and use a 
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principal/agent framework to assess whether and why an implied 
fiduciary duty will maximize wealth for equity holders. Section II 
then re-examines the fiduciary duty in the context of a corporation 
with multiple claimants to see how conflicts can arise between 
multiple constituencies—different classes of equityholders. It 
addresses what analysis should determine whether an action that 
adversely affects one class of equityholders but is still in the best 
interest of the firm is consistent with the agent’s duties. It briefly 
discusses an early example of investor conflict in the Dodge22 case 
to outline the proper role of an agent in such conflicts. Had the 
lawyer and client been more skilled in identifying the value of 
accumulating cash as an option to positioning the firm to seize on 
future opportunities, the board’s decision might have been immune 
from the allegations of the minority common stockholder. Where 
the adversely affected party can protect itself through contract or 
other means, making the agent liable under a fiduciary obligation 
would not minimize costs. But where such contractual protections 
are not possible and there is an adverse effect on one claimant, a 
limited fiduciary protection for the preferred might be wealth 
enhancing. 
Section III utilizes the analysis in Sections I and II to 
address fiduciary duty where there are multiple claimants but no 
inter-investor conflict. It explains why all investors, regardless of 
type, are entitled to benefit from a rule against waste or depletion of 
the assets of the firm and against coercion.23 It is a vertical duty 
owed by the firm’s agents to all stockholders.  
Section IV uses the prior analyses in Sections I-III to assess 
the results in several recent Delaware cases involving the fiduciary 
duty issue in conflicts between venture capitalist preferred and 
                                                 
22 Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) is an example where had the 
lawyer or client wanted to do so, it could have convinced the court that even if 
the minority stockholder was adversely affected by the board’s decision to retain 
cash, the  decision was still consonant with a pursuit of long-term value for the 
firm and thus within the board’s allowable discretion. Had the court focused on 
comparing the present value of alternative future return stream strategies 
embraced by the competing common stockholders, it might have reached a 
different result.  
23 Gradient OC Master, Ltd. V. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A. 2d 104, 117 (De. 
Ch. 2007).  (“In that regard, this Court has recognized that preferred 
shareholders share the same right as common shareholders to be free from 
wrongful coercion in a stockholder vote.”). 
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common stockholders. It concludes that the results are welfare 
maximizing since granting an ex post fiduciary protection to the 
preferred would likely be re-contracted around in future cases, 
whereas a contrary result would cause an immediate hit to the 
common stockholders, and would not be cost minimizing. These 
cases should be easy cases to decide under a cost minimizing 
analytical structure.  
Section V examines different types of preferred stock 
settings where the feasibility of contractual protection, pricing 
discounts, or yield adjustments may be particularly difficult or 
where contractual protection, even if feasible, would not offer an 
adequate remedy as where the preferred has no contract claim 
against the board. In such cases, if the board recklessly pursues a 
“Hail Mary” option with an infinitesimal chance of succeeding that 
might result in a payoff for the common but would certainly wipe 
out all value for the preferred, a narrowly tailored fiduciary 
protection should be adopted in that subset of non-vc preferred 
stock cases where contractual protection for the investor against 
wealth shifting is not realistic. In such narrow cases, a limited 
fiduciary protection against reckless investments would be wealth 
maximizing.24 
 
Section I. Justificative Framework for Law-Supplied Term: 
The Fiduciary Duty 
 
Before deciding whether the law should imply a fiduciary 
duty to the preferred beyond the duty owed to all stockholders one 
must first understand the ultimate premise of any exchange—that 
parties to an exchange will seek to minimize the transaction costs of 
the exchange as a way of maximizing the surplus available. That 
premise, together with the reality that “a ‘fiduciary’ duty is a 
contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of 
specification and monitoring,”25 explains why the law supplies a 
fiduciary duty26 to govern an agent’s actions toward any investor 
                                                 
24 See supra note 12. 
25 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 
J. LAW & ECON. 425, 427 (1993). 
26 “[T]he primary non-ballot box legal constraint on them [the directors] is the 
enforcement of their equitable fiduciary duties.” See Leo Strine, Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: 
The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 629, 641 
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when the agent has discretion over a pool of assets.27 If that 
discretion is not constrained, there will be a contractual hazard—an 
agency cost—that will constitute a cost and decrease surplus from 
the exchange.  
Agency costs affect all types of investors and stock.28 When 
the investor furnishes resources and delegates discretion to make 
decisions over how to use the assets for a firm, there is necessarily a 
separation of ownership and control.29 Another critical component 
to this agency relationship involves “delegating some decision 
making to the agent.”30 The agent who receives a fixed wage may 
take actions that diverge from the principal’s interest, a type of 
agency cost. The agent may not exert as much effort as the principal 
would like (shirking) or may expropriate assets to his or her own 
private benefit. These risks can all be categorized as involving a 
propensity to diverge31 or moral hazard.32 These agency risks 
                                                                                                             
(2010). In many states it was developed as a means of “ensuring that the 
capacious authority granted to directors by the DGCL was not misused.” Id. at 
642.  
27 The willingness of the law to supply a fiduciary obligation to constrain an 
agent with discretion over the assets of the principal goes back in time to the law 
merchant having a custom to constrain the agent by way of a performance 
obligation. AVNER GRIEF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN 
ECONOMY. the performance obligation adopted then was to enhance the growth, 
surplus and wealth effects in the context of a particular instance of exchange of a 
commission paid by a delegating principal for the services rendered by the 
agent. 
28 “Firms with lower expected agency problems have higher expected values.” 
DOUGLAS J. CUMMINGS & SOFIA JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE 
EQUITY CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 56 (2013). See M. C. 
Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINAN. ECON. 305 (1976).  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 308. 
31 Email from Ronald J. Coffey Professor Emeritus Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law to Kenneth Davis, Professor of Law University of 
Wisconsin School of Law dated January 27, 2005.  
32 Moral hazard is a type of opportunistic behavior. In the context of insurance 
it refers to the failure of insured persons “to behave in a fully responsible way 
and take appropriate risk-mitigating actions” once covered under an insurance 
policy. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 47. Moral hazard problems also arise 
in the principal/agent context. Because the principal cannot directly see the 
agent’s actions and because the agent cannot discern whether the poor outcomes 
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constitute costs that reduce the surplus from any exchange 
involving a principal and agent.33 Yet, since there is benefit to 
giving the agent discretion over the assets, the discretion will 
persist.34 
In determining whether to supply a performance obligation 
that the parties did not bargain for in corporate contexts, the basic 
structure for implied terms is the same as in the context of 
Contracts. We start with the question of why and “how … fiduciary 
duties sneak into these contracts”35 between managers or directors 
and investors. In these consensual bargained-for contexts, the 
answer to this fundamental question of why the law supplies a 
fiduciary duty depends on the recognition that corporations are 
“enduring (relational) contracts”36 and “the proposition that people 
cannot see the future well enough to resolve all contingencies ahead 
of time.”37 Between the managers and the equity holders of the 
residual claims, “[t]he only promise that makes sense in such an 
open-ended relation is to work hard and honestly.”38  
There is a recurring risk of opportunistic behavior or moral 
hazard. The question in the principal/agent context is always the 
same: why did the parties not reach a more pointedly reciprocal 
exchange? It may be because the very same terms of a generalized 
                                                                                                             
are due to lack of effort or to exogenous events. See David E.M. Sappington, 
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1991). “[T]he 
principal can’t observe...the level of effort exerted by the agent. See also 
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37-38 (John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985) (noting that “principal cannot observe the actions themselves but may 
make some observations, for example, of the output.”) 
33 See infra note 43.  
34 For a discussion of when optimal contracts can contain “two forms of 
incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the contract does not specify the 
parties’ behavior with sufficient detail; and rigidity, meaning the parties’ 
obligations are not sufficiently contingent on the external state” see Pierpalo 
Battigalli and Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing 
Contracts, 92 AMER. ECON. REV. 798 (2002). 
35  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, at 90.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. See also Easterbrook & Fischel,  supra note 25 (noting that “when one 
party hires another’s expertise, there is not much they can write down”) 
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performance commitment are of such a general nature that the 
parties did not think it necessary to bargain to control the behavior. 
Parties would not think to bargain in instances where there is a 
recurring threat of opportunism that is virtually the same throughout 
a class of transactions, namely, those in which the agent is given 
discretion over a pool of assets and there is risk of a divergence 
between the interest of the agent and the principal.39 
The commonplace nature of the threat of opportunism in a 
contract or a propensity to diverge in an agency context and the 
costs of negotiating express contractual controls that are meaningful 
may mean that the most cost effective way of controlling the 
behavior is a law-supplied fiduciary obligation.  To determine 
whether a law-supplied obligation is efficient in the principal/agent 
in the corporate context using a welfare maximizing criterion, one 
that determines whether the intervention will be welfare 
maximizing after all costs of intervention are weighed against the 
cost of parties privately solving certain problems that act as a drag 
on gains from trade, one must first understand the nature of 
principal/agent relationship.  
In addressing whether the law should intervene to 
supplement a contract by implying a term or a fiduciary obligation, 
the overarching question is: in pursuit of what ultimacy is the 
adjudicator justified in cancelling or modifying express terms of an 
exchange institution, given certain assumptions about reality?40 In 
the context of exchange transactions, the ultimacy would be the 
maximization of gains from exchange. Resolving the impact of an 
intervention on that ultimacy requires an analysis of the ex ante 
effects in future transactions and the effects on parties’ contracts in 
the future. Additionally, in settings involving shareholders using the 
maximization directive, one must assess how the intervention will 
affect different constituencies/claimants with different risk/return 
features in their arrangement with the firm.41  
                                                 
39 E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Aug. 19, 2008, 13:10 EDT) 
(on file with author) (discussing legislatively supplied default rules as an 
alternative). 
40 Ronald J. Coffey, Perspectives on Legal Methods (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author) 
41 See infra at 23-28. 
 Page 14 
This Article assumes that that law in this context should act 
“as an instrument to promote the achievement of specifically 
identifiable ultimate goals...selected as worthy by the decision-
maker….”42 The ultimacy here is to maximize gains from trade and 
to minimize the cost of transacting43 (in short to maximize welfare)  
and to increase those gains using certain assumptions about reality. 
Assumptions about reality include the impediments to bargaining as 
well as the likely future effects of law-supplied intervention on 
parties’ behavior (i.e. would they contract around the rule?).   
Parties will seek to minimize these agency costs to increase 
the surplus from exchange.44 Yet, attempting to control the effort of 
the agent is costly or unobtainable through contract because one 
cannot contract on effort.45 Effort remains unverifiable to a court 
even if is observable by the principal.46 Because a contracting 
solution is unobtainable, the principal will seek to reduce those 
costs in other ways, such as by monitoring the agent or devising 
incentive alignment schemes to better align the agent’s efforts with 
the principal’s objectives.47 So while theoretically, the parties could 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 The efforts to minimize transaction costs by parties is driven by a desire to 
increase the surplus from exchange. These costs have been neglected. See 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 17. 
44 The inability to control agency costs by contract leads Easterbrook and 
Fischel to embrace the hypothetical bargain contract as the basis for fiduciary 
duties. “A court setting out to protect principals from their agents must use the 
hypothetical contract approach; the only alternative is to injure the parties the 
rule makers want to help.” Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, at 431.  
45 The inability of the principal to observe the effort of the agent and the 
implications of that fact for contracting schemes to incentivize agents is 
explored in Sappington, supra note 32, at 46.  
46 For an insightful discussion of the non-verifiability of effort problem in the 
context of the principal agent relationship of employer and employee, see 
Stewart J. Schwab, Life Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 20 (1993). See also Robert E. Scott & 
George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 
CASE WES. L. REV. 187, 191 (2005) (explaining that “back-end obstacles have 
driven a large body of the theorists’ models: namely that some states of the 
world are not verifiable to a court, even though they may be observable to both 
parties.”) 
47 These are known as mechanism design, incentive alignment schemes in the 
agency literature. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 308. For a 
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control agency costs through contract, financial economics suggests 
that “Contracts can be designed to enable a principal to mitigate 
agency problems but agency problems can never be fully 
eliminated.”48  
In the context of a corporation/firm with common 
stockholders investing and delegating discretion to the agent, the 
law has resolved that the principal duty of the board is to maximize 
the firm’s value and it furnishes a judicially supplied fiduciary 
obligation to constrain the actions of the agent.49 Section 379 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY50 operates in a similar fashion. 
In such settings, there are pervasive barriers to common stock 
shareholders controlling by express and detailed contracts all of the 
various ways in which the agent may diverge and shirk due to the 
problems of bounded rationality and uncertainty. The prospect of 
this propensity to diverge, which is endemic to situations involving 
a separation of ownership and control51 and a human tendency 
toward opportunism, has a downward effect on the present value of 
the exchange institution at the time of formation. In those 
circumstances the law supplies the fiduciary obligation to prevent 
that loss in value. The assumption is that the parties themselves 
would have agreed to a fiduciary obligation to control the 
propensity to diverge were it not for barriers to including it 
expressly. As Easterbrook and Fischel assert, “[t]he fiduciary 
principle is an alternative to elaborate promises and extra 
monitoring.”52 
In addition to the problems of bounded rationality and 
                                                                                                             
discussion of the difficulties of incentive alignment schemes, see Kostritsky, 
supra note 9, at 659 n.142.  
48 DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE 
EQUITY CONTRACTING 44 (2014). 
49 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, at 426 (explaining the “fiduciary 
package” and the duty of loyalty as one that “both principal and agent enter for 
gain….” ) 
50 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2ND SECTION 379. See also RESTATEMENT OF 
AGENCY 3D Section 8.08. 
51 ADOLPH BERLE AND G.C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
52 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1996). 
 Page 16 
uncertainty, common stock shareholders are dispersed.53 Thus, it 
may be difficult for them to to act together as a single holder 
capable of bargaining effectively to negotiate the contractual 
provisions that control agency costs. Moreover, in the case of a 
common stock shareholder principal delegating discretion to the 
agent, he may assume that the problem of agency costs is so 
pervasive and so obvious that courts will necessarily police against 
such behavior as part of its equitable jurisdiction. The 
commonplace quality of such terms may explain why the 
transactors (common stockholders) did not bother to explicate the 
risk in their bargain.  
Of course, the principal could monitor or screen the agent to 
find out his or her “propensity to diverge.”54 The principal could 
also adjust the compensation paid to the agent to compensate for the 
divergence. The principal could use incentive schemes to 
compensate the agent for effort or results. These are all private 
strategies that the parties could use to control agency costs; 
however, they are all costly and subject to budget constraints. First, 
the agent may have information that the principal does not have 
about the actions taken. The agent may not work for a knocked 
down wage.55 Also, express contracts may be too costly because the 
agent’s decision-making will depend on information not available at 
the time the agent is engaged. In adopting the fiduciary obligation 
to govern the discretion of the agent toward common stockholders, 
the law supplies a term to deal with a recurring problem of the 
“propensity to diverge”56 and thus reduces agency costs. The issue 
for the courts or the legislature supplying a fiduciary obligation is 
whether the performance obligation introduces new costs that offset 
or exceed the benefits of the law-supplied term.  
                                                 
53 LUCIAN BEBCHUK, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 91 (1990). 
54 For a discussion of these private devices to reduce the costs of unremedied 
shirking, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, 
and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual  Bargaining, 44 HASTINGS L. 
J. 621, 655-57 (1993). 
55 See Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation 
of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 367 (1983) (noting that cutting the 
worker’s wage will not solve the problem of shirking “because the gain to the 
shirker and therefore his acceptable compensating wage discount is less than the 
cost to the firm from the shirking behavior.” Id. at 368.) 
56 Coffey email, supra note 39. 
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Secton II. Complicating the Principal/Agent Relationship; 
Multiple Claimants 
 
Understanding whether an adjudicator should add to or 
cancel terms in the corporate context, by implying a fiduciary duty, 
to increase gains from trade and maximize welfare by constraining 
shirking, moral hazard, and opportunism requires an analysis of the 
principal/agent aspect of investment contracts: the delegation issue. 
This is the basic separation of ownership and control discussed in 
the preceding section. 
When an investor furnishes resources (perhaps cash), the 
firm issues stock and gives the investors claims against the firm. 
Separate issues, apart from the basic fiduciary duty, arise from the 
fact that different classes of stockholders have different risk/return 
preferences.57 Then, all investments, regardless of the risk/return 
profile differences, involve the investor in a principal/agent 
relationship with the management of the firm.58 The agent begins 
controlling the asset pool and takes over management of the firm, 
which provides the source of return streams to the claimants or 
investors. The agent is also tasked with honoring the terms of the 
claims of the different types of investors.59 The agent’s operation of 
the firm affects the total value of the firm and the aggregate value of 
the different types of claims against the firm.60  
                                                 
57 This need not be the case of course. One could have only a single class of 
stock or dual classes of common stock but the principal/agent framework would 
still be applicable. The divergence in risk/return preferences and the 
implications of those divergences will be explored in the section on horizontal 
conflicts. The common stockholder wants higher risk/higher return and the 
preferred stockholder wants lower risk/lower return. 
58 See Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008); see also Frank H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991) (the 
corporate contract makes managers the agents of the equity investors.”) 
59 All of these claimants or stakeholders have a different set of variables in 
terms of the projected timing, amount  and uncertainty depending on its claims 
against the global return stream from the firm. Under value maximization 
theory, “managers should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run 
market value of the firm. Total value is the sum of all values of all financial 
claims on the firm—including equity, debt, preferred stock, and warrants.” 
Jensen & Mecking, supra note 28, at 236. 
60 See E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 67-77 (1972).   
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Recognizing this agency relationship and the different 
risk/return features that each stakeholder has depends on the terms 
of her claims against the global return stream of the firm, the 
different set of variables in terms of timing amount, and uncertainty 
for each stakeholder. This has ramifications for the types of 
obligations the agent owes the principals in the context of the agent 
making various decisions in the corporate context for multiple 
constituencies. The global value for the firm is the present value of 
a future stream of returns. One controversy is how the agent for 
principals with multiple competing objectives should act on behalf 
of the claimants and whether the court should imply terms for a set 
of claimants beyond (1) the fiduciary duty applicable to all 
claimants and (2) any specially negotiated contract provisions for 
particular claimants. The determining principle would be whether 
the intervention/rule maximizes value and welfare for the firm and 
equity value as a whole.  
Understanding the centrality of the principal/agent 
relationship will helpfully reorient the thinking away from whether 
a board action “harms” one adversely affected class to analyzing 
what a board must do to fulfill its duties as agent for the firm when 
there are multiple constituencies. Even under the doctrine of 
common shareholder wealth maximization as a means of 
maximizing the long term value of the firm, the board can shift 
value from present to future stockholders and can wipe out the 
value of the common when it is in the best interests of the firm.61 As 
agent, the board can make changes in the asset pool that negatively 
affect some classes without sacrificing value.62 In determining value 
one must be able to compare and compute the present values of 
alternative future return stream strategies.63 To dutifully operate the 
firm and manage the asset pool, the board must be free to engage in 
strategies that adversely impact some classes of claimants if the 
strategy is minimizing the cost of exchange and maximizing the 
                                                 
61 See Orban v. Field, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 148 (“A board may certainly 
deploy corporate power against its own shareholders in some circumstances -- 
the greater good justifying the action -- but when it does, it should be required to 
demonstrate that it acted both in good faith and reasonably.”). 
62 See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Rights Assignments, 
Firm Detriment, and the Agent’s Performance Obligation, 13 CAN. U. S. L. J. 
155 (1988).  
63 See Coffey email.  
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gains from exchange and production. Any other strategy would be 
dispreferred ex ante by the claimants. One example involves 
common stockholders and a possible judicial rule outlawing 
corporate action that would wipe out the common stock. This option 
would outlaw such action even if such action were in the best 
interest of the corporation. Although ex post common stockholders 
would want such a rule, ex ante they would disprefer it since such a 
pro-common stockholder rule would actually make it harder to get 
financing from banks, debt and preferred stock. Those costs might 
outweigh the benefits of the law-supplied protective rule.  
Many possible combinations of investments exist and 
finding a breach of some non-contractual or fiduciary obligation 
whenever one class of investors would prefer a different choice 
would add significantly to the cost of exchange and thus would not 
be preferred ex ante, at least where the class of investors adversely 
affected could anticipate the risk and provide for it by contract or 
buy the stock at a discount to compensate for the risk.  
 
Section III. When are Fiduciary Duties Owed to All 
Shareholders and Why: The Vertical Conflict Where Multiple 
Claimants Exist But No Inter-Investor Conflict 
 
When there are multiple claimants who have furnished 
resources to a firm, they will hold different types of investments 
with different terms/claims. Some will invest with loans and take 
bonds in return. In that case, the bondholders’ investments are 
governed almost entirely by detailed express contracts.64 Others will 
take an ownership interest by investing, and be furnished stock in 
return. Here, both common stockholders and preferred stockholders 
face the prospect of agency costs as they furnish resources to an 
agent who may have a propensity to diverge.65 The inability to 
foresee all the agent’s possible choices will interfere with the ability 
of a contract to expressly control all the potential varieties of 
agency costs.66  
                                                 
64 See David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary 
Duty, 65 St. John’s L. Rev. 1023, 1037 (1991) (referring to ability of 
bondholders to achieve “optimal” contracts). 
65 Coffey email, supra note 39.   
66 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 
(1991).  
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If obstacles exist to contractual controls of agency costs 
between a principal (any furnisher of resources who receives stock 
in return), across different principal/agent relationships, (1) are 
there reasons to think that the law could have a beneficial welfare 
maximizing role to play in controlling agency costs as by supplying 
a term to control the behavior of the agent by furnishing a rule 
whose content prevents risks such as the misappropriation or theft 
of the asset pool; and (2) would the answer to that question of 
whether the law could improve welfare by supplying a term differ if 
the question arose in the context of a board who was acting as an 
agent for two classes of shareholders who had different interests 
and different risk/return profiles and where the agent could take 
actions that had reverberative effects on one claimant while having 
no effect on the value of the firm.  
In the case where the agent has been tasked with managing 
the asset pool and engages in actions that are wasteful or deplete the 
assets of the firm, all classes of claimants are protected.67 Actions 
against directors for misappropriation make sense in terms of the 
principal/agent model and the fiduciary duty analyzed in the 
preceding section. Because the director is the agent for the 
resources furnished by different classes of investors, all investors 
are equally entitled to sue the director/agent for breach of the duty 
of loyalty when assets are misappropriated. 68 That type of conduct 
would be contrary to the agent’s fundamental duty of loyalty to care 
for assets and invest them for the firm. This type of lawsuit against 
a firm’s agent for waste is classified as a vertical conflict.69 Each 
class of preferred or common is owed a duty of loyalty by the agent 
(a vertical relationship) not to misappropriate or steal assets from 
the firm. A duty of loyalty “demands that a fiduciary make a good 
faith effort to advance the best interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders.”70 All who have invested in a pool of assets to 
                                                 
67 Professor Coffey explains the particular harm suffered by the “disposition of 
firm assets”  as follows: “the firm is necessarily exposed to the possibility not 
only of surrendering a portion of the total gains from exchange that may inhere 
in the transaction, but also of suffering outright wealth transfers.” Coffey, Firm 
Opportunities, supra note 20, at 159-60. 
68 See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 463 (citing Rosan v. Chicago Milwaukee where 
“court refused to dismiss the stockholder’s derivative claim of corporate 
waste…”).  
69 Id. at 449. 
70 Strine et al, supra note 26, at 635. The Model Business Corporation Act 
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produce a future stream of returns for the claimants are entitled to 
expect that the agent will use the assets for the firm and not 
misappropriate them. 
In this class of cases, the law intervenes with implied duties 
to prevent waste and misappropriation of assets. The conduct is so 
pervasive that one would anticipate that the law would intervene to 
control it rather than making every stockholder negotiate directly 
for such protection when the risk is endemic and a result of the 
structural separation of ownership and control and of the risk of 
opportunism. The same justification may explain why the law 
supplies bankruptcy protections to all holders of debt rather than 
forcing each to negotiate for bankruptcy priorities.71 Forcing such 
bargaining to gain protection against a common and recurrent risk, 
such as expropriation (or a fight for the assets among creditors 
faced with an insolvent company), would be costly and might deter 
parties from investing ex ante and act as a drag on gains from trade 
that would discourage investment.   
Implying a duty that protects against waste is consistent with 
the duty to maximize welfare and the risk/return profile differences 
among different classes of claimants would not alter the nature of 
the duty owed to protect the asset pool. Both classes of 
stockholders, whatever their risk/return profile would not want the 
firm to have the assets depleted since those assets will furnish the 
pool from which each claimant calculates value.  
 
Section IV. Horizontal Conflicts between Preferred and 
Common Stockholders 
 
A. The Basic Approach to Preferred Shareholder Rights: 
Contractual Rights Plus Implied Duties to All Shareholders 
 
If the furnishers of resources--the principals-- are preferred 
stockholders, do they and should they get the benefit of any law-
supplied rules in their favor? According to case law, courts find that 
if the preferred are invoking rights that they share with the common 
                                                                                                             
stresses that “a lack of good faith is presented where a board ‘lacked an actual 
intention to advance corporate welfare…” 
71 See Stanley Longhofer, Bankruptcy Rules and Debt Contracting, On the 
Relative Efficiency of Absolute Priority, Proportionate Priority and First-Come, 
First-Served Rules, Federal Reserve Working Paper No. 94-15 (1994). 
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stockholders, then they benefit from a law-supplied rule in their 
favor that extends to common and preferred shareholders alike.72 
Thus, in cases of vertical conflict, where the agent misappropriates 
or wastes assets, the preferred can sue just like common 
stockholders. The justification for the law supplied rule lies in the 
supposition that an implied duty to control that behavior is wealth 
enhancing for the firm. As one scholar has noted courts in 
confronting implied duties must always ask: “improvement in the 
achievement of what ultimacy justifies an adjudicator’s addition, 
cancellation, or modification of express terms negotiated during an 
exchange and what assumptions about reality73 must be entertained 
to demonstrate the improvement?” (hereinafter referred to as the 
vaulting question or VQ).74 
However, the preferred stockholders may want a court to go 
beyond both the duties owed to all stockholders, including the 
common, not to waste assets and beyond the duty owed to all 
stockholders to maximize value for the firm and the common 
stockholders. Preferred holders may want protections beyond the 
express terms negotiated in their preferred stock agreement that 
imply additional protections for the preferred. Preferred 
stockholders will likely seek such protection when their interests 
                                                 
72 See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(“where however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the common 
stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of such 
right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well 
as legal standards”).  
73 Assumptions about reality must include an assessment of what goals parties 
have and how they will react to legal rules. This article assumes that rational 
actors will seek to maximize the joint benefits of their exchanges. Under 
neoclassical economics actors exhibit a “maximizing orientation.” WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 10, at 44-45.  
74  In several instances authors writing about preferred stock have argued for 
additional legal protection to prevent oppression of the preferred or to police 
against specific types of bad conduct, such as opportunistic amendment, see e.g. 
Mitchell, Bratto without addressing the VQ so it is unclear under such analyses 
if the protection would be welfare enchancing ex ante. Without using the 
analysis suggested here one cannot decide whether intervention would be value 
enhancing so it would premature to decide that protection is needed. Of course, 
ex post, the preferred want additional protection. A court however must address 
whether ex ante the parties would have bargained for such protection and if so 
what would they have given up to secure that protection? Would the tradeoff 
have been worth it?  
 Page 23 
diverge from those of common stockholders. 
Whether the law should intervene to supplement the 
preferred stock’s bargain, which consists of statutory terms, 
additional contract terms, and regulatory rules that govern such 
stock, has prompted a flurry of different approaches. Some authors 
urge courts to employ a good faith scrutiny to conflicts between 
preferred and common stock to avoid results that are not value 
maximizing in the aggregate.75  Others argue that courts should 
never afford preferred protection beyond the ordinary fiduciary 
protection afforded all stockholders or the special contractual 
provisions (known as the contractual rights, limitations and 
preferences, or CPRL’s) negotiated by the issuer and the preferred 
stockholder.76 One critic argues for a “division of board control 
between the two classes of equity . . . to ensure their harmonious 
co-existence.”77  Chancellor Strine, of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, however, opposes such suggestions and argues that 
subjecting the defendants to heightened scrutiny under new 
standards of review will start courts on an unguided “speculative 
journey.”78 
To determine which of these approaches should govern or 
whether a new approach is called for, the next section of the Article 
will develop a framework for analyzing this question of duties of 
the board between two sets of claimants, who have different 
risk/return profiles and who have accordingly negotiated different 
terms of their claims (in their contracts) on the asset pool to reflect 
those differences. The Article will revisit a case involving dual 
classes of common stock and then examine several recent cases 
involving conflicts between preferred and common stockholders. 
                                                 
75 Bratton and Wachter want a protective good faith obligation to ensure that 
the common cannot force the preferred to wait to cash out. See supra note 2, at 
1889. Of course, as Chancellor Strine points out, the preferred could avoid the 
wait by negotiating a provision that forced a liquidation. Whether good faith is 
really an additional obligation or is subsumed under the larger duty of loyalty is 
explored by Strine, et al in 98 GEO. L. J. 629. See Strine, supra note 26, at 2035 
for a discussion of the difficulties with an untethered good faith scrutiny of 
board action toward the preferred.  
76 Charles Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 1163, 1166 (2013).         
77 Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
161, 165 (2014).  
78 Strine, supra note 26, at 2036.  
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Reforms affecting preferred should be evaluated using the 
analytical tools outlined for all law-supplied terms. The principal 
components which will resolve these conflicts are the 
principal/agent frame, the VQ—an analysis of whether an implied 
term’s benefits will exceed any costs from the term-- and a 
recognition of the different risk/return profiles held by different 
claimants.79 When there are multiple competing objectives or 
multiple constituencies, as with preferred and common stock, there 
are two dominant theories of what should govern the director’s 
duty: (1) value maximization for the firm or (2) value for a 
stakeholder who has a different set of variables in terms of timing, 
amount and uncertainty than the firm. This article endorses (1). 
Other issues which bear on the horizontal conflicts include: which 
class of investors controls the directors, the effect of the tradeoff 
between risk and return under conditions of uncertainty on the 
agent’s decisions for the firm, the duties owed to all equity holders, 
and the effect of express terms on the resolution of conflicts how 
conflicts between investors. These issues all surface in the context 
of whether the law should add to or cancel terms negotiated by the 
parties, particularly preferred shareholders. The effects of any 
judicial intervention on the capital markets will also be considered, 
as an integral part of any wealth enhancing analysis.  
Potential conflicts between the interests of the preferred and 
the common may arise in cases where: (1) the preferred has voting 
control of the company’s board and takes action favoring the 
preferred so that the concern is for ill treatment of the common; (2) 
the same case as (1) but the directors, once elected, act against the 
preferred in favor of the common but not in direct violation of any 
contract rights; (3) Same as (2) but the directors act against the 
common and the preferred. In a second class of cases: (B1) the 
common has voting control of the company and the board takes 
action favoring the common, so there is concern that the board is 
abusing the preferred; (B2) The common has voting control and the 
directors, once elected, act against the interest of the common; (B3) 
Same as above but the directors, once elected, act against the 
common and preferred. In a third scenario there is a standoff as no 
                                                 
79 Differences exist as to the claimants’ present value of the stream of returns 
from the asset pool based on the individual preferences on timing, uncertainty 
and amount of those returns. The firm has present value of that income stream 
based on global values assigned to timing, uncertainty and amount of returns for 
the firm. 
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one class controls the directors and the directors favor one class or 
another or favor themselves.  
All of these scenarios raise the issue of what principles and 
armature should govern the board as it acts as an agent for both 
preferred and common when their interests conflict. In analyzing 
how these conflicts should be resolved, one should consider the 
statutory directives that the board must act in the best interest of the 
corporation. The language in the MCBA, for example, is in 8:30(a) 
and reads “Each member of the board of directors, when 
discharging the duties of a director, shall act (1) in good faith, and 
(2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.”80  Despite many opportunities to 
amend that language, the drafters have not added language saying 
that the director should act to maximize the interests of one class of 
claimants or the other, so acting in the best interest of the 
corporation is the key important factor. This fact may help to 
resolve whether a cause of action should exist or a term should be 
added to constrain the agent—the board—to protect one class from 
another when the action taken by an agent does not negatively 
impact the asset pool or the firm. Regardless of which investor class 
controls the board, is there a cause of action when the agent, the 
board, takes actions that negatively impact one group of 
stockholders? How does the answer change if the negatively 
affected is in control of the board? How does the answer change if 
the agent is not disinterested because of a conflict of interest?81  
                                                 
80 See also Ohio statute 1701.59 to like effect. “(B)  A director shall perform 
the director’s duties as a director, including the duties as a member of any 
committee of the directors upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would use under similar circumstances. A director serving on a 
committee of directors is acting as a director.” 
81In resolving these conflicts one must also consider whether the fact the Board 
is disinterested enough to make a decision. If the directors own a particular type 
of stock and the decision they are making will have a material effect on their 
wealth, then the directors are not disinterested as they will profit if one class of 
claimants is favored over another. In such cases the transactions must meet an 
entire fairness standard.  The entire fairness standard applies “[b]ecause even a 
subjectively well-motivated fiduciary might deal with himself less aggressively 
than he would with a third party.” Strine et al., supra note 26, at 643.  
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 When there are two investors rather than a single claimant, 
an agent is making all the tradeoffs that a single investor would 
make if he were both operating the firm and investing. In the 
process of making choices about how to invest the pool of assets 
and what projects to pursue for the firm, the agent (the board) 
considers all sort of combinations of investment strategies. In 
making these determinations about the asset pool, the agent might 
consider the different characteristics of investors, wealth shifting 
issues, and the agent’s duties to the firm and to the pool of assets.82  
                                                 
82 The diagram is from Professor R.J. Coffey. He explains as follows: “The 
following explanation for the diagram will be important: 1. Any four cornered 
box is a person, either a natural or non-natural person. 1. Any circle is an asset 
(property: tangle, intangible, real financial-including claims of various terms 
against another person. It is an asset of the person inside whose box it is located. 
The terms of the claims need to be elaborated for each type of claim. Terms fall 
into two basic categories: right of control and right to distributions. 3. A single 
arrowhead pointing up against a person is a claim held by some other person 
against the person to whom the arrow points. At the other end of the shaft of the 
arrow is a circle in the box representing the claimant, showing that the claim 
against the pointee (obligor) is correlatively an asset of the person who holds it. 
Along the shaft of the claim is a double arrow showing the direction of the 
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In managing assets, the agent may consider that different 
classes of investors have different desired outcomes in part 
influenced by the investor’s risk tolerance/risk aversion, linked to a 
targeted return. The agent also considers the time line of the 
investors, with common stock and preferred stock having 
perpetually infinite investment periods.83 In the diagram above 
involving a single agent and a common stockholder and preferred 
stockholder, the agent is the delegate of two different principals, 
who to suit (match) their diverse preferences, endowments and 
beliefs, have chosen to hold different types of claims with disparate 
terms regarding control over the assets of the firm and over 
distributions (particularly the time, amount and uncertainty of the 
latter).  
Other factors drive investor differentiation. Employee/stock 
investors have a preference for continuing employment—a non-
monetary return. Another non-monetary return often focuses on the 
Founder’s controlling the destiny of its “child” when they found a 
company. Even preferred investors may differ markedly with late 
round investors looking for a lower risk investment than earlier 
rounds.84 
Differentiation among investors may affect the negotiated 
                                                                                                             
arrows along lines represents the direction of movement in the transfer of an 
asset from one holder to another.  5.The first line shows the issuance by the firm 
of a claim against the firm to Pp (principal in the form of a holder of preferred 
claims terms) which is show as an asset (circle of Pp’s box). The other piece of 
the exchange is the transfer from Pp of something (cash, nonservice intangibles, 
or human capital intangibles) to the firm which thereafter holds those things as 
its assets. Hence the line through the asset circle representing Pp because the 
value furnished to the firm is no longer, his, hers or its. The second exchange is 
a ditto of the first. Pc (principal who is issued and becomes the holder of a 
residual (nonpreferred, common) claim against the firm and in exchange 
transfers something. Ditto therefore as to the precise terms of the claims that are 
issued by to Pc by the firm. 6. Agent is a person given plenary and discretionary 
decisionmaking with respect to the operation of the assets.” Diagram and 
comments by Professor Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western 
Reserve School of Law. 
83 It is for this reason that preferred stockholders “ultimately need an exist 
vehicle.” See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 87 
(1999). 
84 For a discussion of the differences between earlier and later rounds of VC 
financing. BARTLETT, supra note 83, at 304 (“Some venture pools focus in 
whole or part on late-round investments: infusion of cash shortly before the 
company is planning to go public, for example.” Id. at 4). 
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terms in their contracts and the decisions the agent makes when it 
operates the firm. It may also affect how courts evaluate the key 
question of whether intervening to protect a particular class of 
investors will be efficient and maximize total wealth.   
In managing assets among classes of investors, the agent 
must not only consider the differentiation among investors but also 
that the agent has been tasked with managing the assets for the firm. 
That means that the agent must be free to engage in projects 
because they are in the best interests of the firm, even if there are 
some reverberative, negative effects on different classes of 
investors.85 Insights on the wealth shifting that can occur when 
agents make choices helps to make sense of the case law, statutory 
law, the business judgment rule and RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 
SECTION 379.86  It may also help a court understand how horizontal 
conflicts between preferred stockholders and common stockholders 
should be resolved when the board is considered the agent of both 
classes of investors investing in a single firm, under different state 
regimes,87 and under judicial case law refining which constituencies 
should be viewed as first order beneficiaries and why.88 
If a firm has a project with a steady stream of returns and 
decides to invest in a project with a higher risk profile, such as a 
hydrogen car, there may, as far as the firm is concerned, be no value 
sacrificed in terms of the asset pool. As one commentator noted, 
“firm pursuit of an asset-side opportunity might be merely value-
neutral for the firm, and simultaneously more than value neutral for 
shareholders… where the risks associated with returns to the firm 
from its operations is increased.”89 However, there may be profound 
effects on the claimants. In such a case the value of the senior 
                                                 
85 Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 20, at 173. 
86 See supra note 50. 
87 States might differ as to the primary purpose of a corporation. Thirty-Three 
states have some version of a constituency statute that allow directors to 
consider factors other than shareholder wealth maximization. See David P. 
Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance: 
Reflections by a Recovering Corporate Governance Lawyer, 2010-18 CASE. 
WES. L. REV. 639 (2010). 
88 Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law to Juliet P. Kostritsky Professor of Law Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law dated 5/27/15 (on file with author). 
89 Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 20, at 173. 
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claimants may go down while the value of the common stock goes 
up. In these cases involving one or more classes of investors, should 
the law intervene to protect one claimant against the actions of the 
agent and how does the principal/agent frame affect the analysis? 
Further, how does an understanding of an agent’s duty to maximize 
value for the firm90  determine the content of the performance 
obligation owed to each stockholder? The answer depends on the 
terms of the claims against the global return stream, which will 
have a different set of variables (timing, amount, and uncertainty). 
 The following sections will address how the justificational 
framework for implying fiduciary duties between the agent and 
investor should be applied when there are horizontal conflicts 
between two types of investors (preferred and common) under the 
direction of the board of directors as agent in two vastly different 
settings: the venture capital context and other preferred stock 
contexts where the VCs have significant clout to negotiate 
contractual protections and other contexts where preferred 
stockholders have no direct bargaining power and there is no 
underwriter massaging terms on their behalf and significant barriers 
to self-protection exist and there the market price may not account 
for the weaknesses in contractual protection.  Finally, there will be 
some contexts involving sophisticated buyers and publicly traded 
preferred shares where these buyers lack the power to negotiate 
contractual protections and the market can correctly value the 
weaknesses of the particular express terms.91 
 
B. Where Preferred Stockholders Have Clout Or Context 
Makes Implied Protections Unnecessary or Costly. 
 
                                                 
90 In most states the directors are not bound to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders but in the best interests of the corporation. See Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 2, at 1822. 
91 See Michael Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, Understanding the Efficiency of 
the Market for Preferred Stock, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 149, 164 (2013) 
(identifying six factors that determine the price and yield of preferred stock: “[1] 
expected rate of return on long-term, riskless debt [2] various covenants, 
provisions, and restrictions associated with the particular preferred stock . . . [3] 
default risk or the probability that the company will be unable to satisfy some or 
all of the preferred stock indenture requirements . . . [4] the likely recovery rate 
of the preferred stock in the case of bankruptcy or liquidation given current and 
expected future economic conditions [5] tax considerations . . . [and 6] liquidity 
risks or likelihood of being able to sell the preferred stock in a liquid market.” 
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In determining whether there are reasons to supply an 
implied term beyond the terms expressly bargained for in the VC 
context, one should confront whether adding terms will enhance 
wealth, given certain assumptions about reality. The adjudicator 
should first determine whether the preferred stockholders have 
effective clout to bargain over the terms and whether even if a 
contractual protection is lacking, the preferred stockholder had 
alternative ways of having control as by having control over the 
board. Finally, the adjudicator should resolve inter investor 
conflicts in the VC context using a firm wealth maximizing 
perspective. There, whether an agent should be prevented from 
shifting wealth from one class of claimants to should depend on the 
ultimacy of the agent’s duty to advance the best interests of the 
firm.  
For protections beyond the law-supplied fiduciary 
obligations, the default rule in corporate law is that the preferred 
stockholder must negotiate through express contracts so omissions 
are likely to be deliberate.92 Is there a reason that preferred 
stockholders would not have arranged to maximize wealth while 
minimizing transaction costs because of bargaining impediments? 
In determining whether or not a term was omitted by the preferred 
due to bargaining impediments, one must take account of the 
preferred stockholders’ ability to consider negative court decisions. 
Presumably if the preferred want to counteract adverse court 
decisions, many such preferred stockholders have the knowledge 
and clout to know what provisions to add. There is little need to add 
a term by law when parties can contract around negative court 
decisions.  
In the context of preferred shares, the ability to bargain over 
the terms of the PSA, the CRPL’s, may vary across contexts. In 
some instances, as when preferred buy shares in the secondary 
market, there may be no opportunity for the preferred to bargain. In 
other contexts such as venture capital, preferred stockholders may 
have a greater opportunity to bargain over terms. The preferred 
stockholders are generally more monolithic and less diverse a group 
than common stockholders and are thus able to negotiate effectively 
for their interests. This would be true for VCs, but it would also be 
                                                 
92 In some settings of course the obstacles to express contracting may be greater 
as when the preferred buy in the secondary market. In that context, they are not 
negotiating for contractual protections since they have already been negotiated. 
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true for privately placed financing by a single purchaser who buys 
preferred stock. Such purchases occur where a large publicly traded 
company finds it needs a lot of cash to fend off a takeover and 
issues preferred shares on financial terms that are attractive to the 
single purchaser.93 Because the company needs a cash infusion, the 
preferred has clout ex ante. In such cases, there should be little 
concern that the investor/preferred shareholder will not secure 
appropriate protection. The contract will typically not provide the 
preferred shareholder with voting power. However, the investor in 
such situations is typically not looking for voting power, but for a 
stable monetary return.  
Similarly, there is little reason to be concerned with the 
protections offered to the preferred  stockholders when they buy in 
a financing preferred arrangement. There, a late stage company sells 
preferred shares to raise capital through either a private placement 
or a public offering.94 Although the investor/preferred shareholder 
does not participate directly, the private placement agent or the 
underwriter negotiates contractual protections for the preferred 
shareholder.95 
There are still other contexts in which although the preferred 
stockholders do not have great leverage to negotiate over the 
dividend rate or other protective provisions (covenants, preferences) 
there is little need for those contractual protections, so a judicial 
rule of implied protections would not be cost-minimizing. This 
                                                 
93 One such example involved Diamond Shamrock deciding to do a huge 
buyback of common stock to fend off takeover by T. Boone Pickens. The 
company needs cash and issues preferred shares to a single investor such as 
Berkshire Hathaway or The Prudential. The investor buying preferred shares is 
not looking for control but will secure financial terms it cares about such as a 
class vote on articles amendments pertaining to the preferred. 
94 See JANET SMITH, RICHARD L. SMITH & RICHARD T. BLISS, 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE STRATEGY, VALUATION AND DEAL STRUCTURE 53 
(2011) (discussing private placements of convertible preferred stock and its 
advantages over a public offering). Financing preferred is often issued in a 
leveraged buyout, as part of financing for an acquisition, sometimes issued to 
refinance debt or to make major capital investments like a power plant.  
95See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of 
Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461 (1995) (discussing staged financing as a means 
of controlling agency costs). the only constraint might be the placement agent’s 
customer relations with some preferred stockholders. Of course, in large private 
company offerings of preferred stock, the placement agent is obtained by the 
issuer/the company. 
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would be the case, for example, where a large public utility issues 
preferred stock in a publicly underwritten transaction. The terms 
would likely be standardized in the marketplace (that is one utility’s 
preferred looks like any other utility’s preferred that is issued at the 
same time) and the preferred would likely be unable to negotiate 
special terms. However, because the utility has a huge asset base 
and a fairly steady stream of revenue, the covenant package is 
slender and the absence of protective covenants would and should 
not be a basis for implying additional terms; such additions would 
likely be costly. The preferred investors in that context are making a 
lower risk investment. If protections were implied on behalf of the 
preferred who took a low risk investment, the result would add to 
transaction costs as future parties would recontract around the 
outcome. It is only higher risk issuers who need to offer investors 
more protective provisions. Adding protections would burden the 
low risk utility with additional burdens and rearrange the risk 
allocation between the parties. Future utilities might have to offer 
lower rates to investors since they would be saddled with additional 
burdens.  
In resolving the key question of intervention beyond the 
contract, one must look beyond the bargaining power issues. If the 
preferred have bargaining power, the absence of protective terms 
may be a deliberate choice. Even in cases where the preferred lack 
bargaining power to extract protection, to determine whether legal 
intervention would be value maximizing, one should determine if 
there are other private strategies beyond contract that offer 
alternative protection at a lower cost. One of the private 
mechanisms that may work as a protective mechanism when the 
parties lack the clout or foresight to bargain for express provisions 
is the traditional diversification strategy of making many small 
investments, expecting at least some to  paying off, while many 
others will lose or at best break even.96 For some early round 
investors (Angels or some VCs), the preferred may adopt a mixed 
investment policy, partly driven by economic value and a desire for 
their own wealth but partly also eleemosynary as part of an effort to 
grow the greater economy. This differentiation can affect the terms 
negotiated with an issuer and might affect the willingness of a court 
to imply protective terms since the investors may consider 
themselves better off even when their investments fail.  
                                                 
96 Preferred stockholders commonly use this strategy. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 
5, at 257. 
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Another private strategy would be relying on the market 
itself. The market would discount preferred stock whose contractual 
protections were weak, signaling caution to buyers of preferred 
stock.97 For publicly traded shares, one would need to ascribe to the 
efficient market theory proposition that the current trading price 
works and correctly values the weakness of the particular express 
terms (including having the foresight to correctly price future 
changes in circumstances that undermine the preferred shares). 
Another strategy that some preferred use is staged financing. 
Venture capitalists often arrange the financing so that if the 
entrepreneur is not performing or diverting assets for his private 
benefit, the venture capitalist can simply withhold financing at the 
next successive entry point.98 In addition, the venture capitalist can 
arrange for board control or voting control, other private strategies 
that act as a means of protecting the preferred’s interests. 
Finally, in deciding whether to imply a non-negotiated 
protection for the preferred in the VC or other context, the 
adjudicator must account for the conflict as a principal/agent 
problem.99  
Investors are principals who have furnished resources to a 
designated agent who then makes decisions about how to manage a 
pool of assets for a firm.100 The principal/agent aspect of these 
horizontal conflicts has been neglected. That neglect makes it 
harder to resolve horizontal conflicts between preferred and 
common stockholders given the agent’s responsibilities.  
                                                 
97 For example, in considering whether to mandate a rule prohibiting brokers 
from recommending stocks that they have not personally investigated, parties 
might prefer a court not to add such a term since “it raises the price the broker 
will charge and diminishes the investor’s benefit from the transaction.” 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, at 428. 
98 See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of 
Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461 (1995)(discussing staged financing as a means 
of controlling agency costs). 
99 For a discussion of the incentive problems in principal agent relationships, 
see David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 45 (1991). Sappington’s article usefully examines “the sources of 
friction between principal and agent that typically preclude this ideal 
arrangement.” Id. at 46. 
100 When an agent accepts that position of having control over the assets of the 
firm, they are truly an agent in the economic sense. See Cooter & Freedman, 
supra note 66, at 1051; See supra 26 (diagram).  
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The key insight from financial economics is that an agent’s 
decision can produce different and even negative reverberative 
effects on different claimants (one class may benefit and another 
class may be harmed by the agent’s actions) without resulting in 
any sacrifice to the asset pool.101 Moreover, if the claimants can 
anticipate that the firm’s agent will shift wealth to maximize the 
value of the firm, there should be no need to protect an adversely 
affected claimant who could negotiate contractual protections or 
rely on other means such as board control or staged financing. 
If firms shift wealth in this way under wealth maximizing102 
principles, one must address whether there is a reason to prevent the 
board of directors, as the agent, from shifting wealth, and if so, 
under what circumstances. The ultimacy of the director’s obligation 
under most state statutes to advance the best interests of the 
corporation must also be addressed.103 Further questions include 
whether a law-supplied rule should prevent such wealth shifting that 
advantages one claimant at the expense of another, and why and 
when that rule would be supplied, and what the costs of such a rule 
would be. 
Crafting a rule preventing wealth shifting would introduce 
substantial costs. First, it would put the manager in an untenable 
position of having no way “to make tradeoffs between” the two 
competing claimants. 104  Second, this rule would create uncertainty 
                                                 
101 Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note x. As Professor Coffey explains, 
“The strategies by which wealth shifts in favor of shareholders can be 
implemented are quite varied, but all achieve their effects by changing the 
marketable value significant risk (called systemic risk) and expected-return 
features of stock in a favorable direction, while simultaneously moving the same 
attributes of debt in an unfavorable direction.” Id. at 173. 
102 “If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes 
of particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to 
maximize the expected value of the contract for both parties.” Robert E. Scott, A 
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 597, 602 (1990). See also Williamson, recognizing the parties’ “long-
term interest in effecting adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind….” 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 63.  
103 See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Section 1701.59 and Model Business Corporation 
Act Section 8.30 which provides in the Standards of Conduct for Directors that: 
“(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a 
director shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”  
104 Jensen, supra note 11, at 236. 
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for the manager tasked with making a decision. Crafting such a rule 
would introduce substantial costs by putting the manager in an 
untenable position of having no way “to make tradeoffs” between 
the competing claimants.105 A third cost would be the manager’s 
inability to decide in cases whenever one class of claimants is 
adversely affected, possibly leading to a standstill for the company. 
Resolving these issues may depend on the particular state statute 
governing the purpose of a for-profit corporation and on the 
articulation of the director’s duties. Are they phrased in terms of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation106 or of advancing the 
interests of a particular class of claimants?107 
Recognizing the inevitable wealth shifting108 that can occur 
as agents manage assets under conditions of uncertainty and the 
possible mismatch in risk preferences between different classes of 
investors should help determine what strategy the agent of the 
claimants should pursue as well as the limits that should be imposed 
on such choices. In making these determinations, one should 
recognize that, to the extent that wealth shifting is anticipated, 
parties can prevent it by contract or can protect themselves through 
a discounted initial purchase price.109 Thus, in the context of VCs, 
where everything is thought out and anticipated, there may be little 
reason to imply terms protecting the preferred beyond the 
contractual protections negotiated. This is especially true since there 
are costs to the firm of preventing wealth shifting between common 
                                                 
105 Id. at 237.  
106 See supra note 78.  
107 The general linguistic gloss in the case law urging the board to favor the 
common goes back to the duty of the agent to foster the long term value 
maximization of the firm since the interests of the common stock are generally 
more aligned with that goal because of the risk/return reward with common 
stock. 
108 One such suggestion to prevent wealth shifting would be a covenant that 
“would simply prohibit a corporation from acting in a way that reduces the value 
of the preferred stock….” See McEllin, supra note 4, at 924 (2010).  
109 Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 20, at 173. For example, 
bondholders anticipate that shareholders will take actions that benefit 
themselves at the expense of bondholders and sometimes at the expense of the 
firm. Bondholders seek to control such behavior by various indenture provisions 
and evidence suggest that such indenture controls raise the value of the firm. See 
Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis 
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FINAN. ECON. 117, 121 (1979). 
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and preferred and the wealth shifting possibility was factored into 
the price of the stock or prevented by contract. In other contexts, 
where the preferred lack the ability to negotiate directly over terms 
or there is no market price discount for lack of protective 
provisions, a different response to the legal intervention beyond the 
terms of the contract might be more justifiable.110 
 
C. Venture Capital Cases 
 
1. Trados 
An important case involving conflict between the preferred 
and the common was In Re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. The first 
question in reviewing any board action is whether the board owed a 
duty to the common stockholders. If yes, the second question is 
what standard of review should apply when reviewing the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. In Trados, the court found that the directors 
“ow[e] fiduciary duties ‘to the corporation and its shareholders’”111 
including the plaintiff common stockholders. Then, because the 
plaintiff proved a conflict of interest,112 under the governing duty of 
loyalty owed by the board, the court held that the business judgment 
rule did not apply and instead applied the burden of proving the 
entire fairness of the transaction (the most rigorous standard of 
review) to the defendant.113  
The court articulated a two-part test for fairness: fairness of 
the process and the fairness of the price. The court found significant 
flaws in the process, including the failure to consider any possible 
                                                 
110 See infra Section IV.  
111 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 36 (citing N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming 
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007)). 
112 See supra note x on conflict of interest. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 47 (citing 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Van de Walle v. 
Unimation, Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, 1991 WL 29303, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 7, 1991)). 
113 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 45. Under this standard, “Delaware law requires 
that the interested party prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the 
corporation, in the sense that it was on terms as favorable as could have been 
achieved in an arms-length deal subject to market competition.” Strine et al., 
supra note 26, at 643 
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conflict between the preferred and the common. However, under an 
entire fairness review, the court found that because the defendant 
proved a fair price, the process flaws by themselves did not warrant 
a finding of a breach of fiduciary duty.114 Based on a comparison of 
the value of the common stock before and after the merger (both 
had a value of $0), the fairness standard was easily satisfied. 
In its fairness scrutiny, the court looked at the kinds of 
tradeoffs the board must make to determine whether a particular 
strategy should be pursued. The court affirmed the Orban test of 
proving fairness where “there was no future for the business and no 
better alternative for the unit holders.”115 
 
a. Criticisms of Trados: Lack of Fiduciary Protection for 
Preferred as Preferred 
 
Critics of Trados bemoan the Trados case on several 
grounds. The first set of criticisms aims at the lack of fiduciary 
protection for the preferreds and the relegation of the preferred to 
their contractual rights. 116 Other critics argue it was a mistake for 
the Trados court to find that the preferred in control had a fiduciary 
duty to “consider the best interests of the common stockholders in 
making decisions . . ..”117 These critics argue that if the preferred 
wanted to sell the company, they need to pay attention only to 
“whether the sale was at fair market value” 118 and should not owe a 
duty to maximize common stock value or to consider common 
stockholder interest. Under these views, the Trados court 
improperly handed “the entrepreneur [common stockholder] a 
fiduciary backstop” which overcame the deal’s risk allocation.119 
Invoking a non-contractual expectation, the critic argued that that 
the preferred should not have to wait patiently for the company’s 
                                                 
114 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS at 172 (citing Orban) (discussing the ability of the 
board to promote the interest of one class of shareholders at the expense of 
another class of shareholders as long as it is in the corporation’s best interest).     
115 In re Trados, 73 A. 3d at 42. 
116 Bratton criticizes the fact that the law does not recognize a fiduciary 
obligation to the preferred “because they [the preferred rights] are contractual.” 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1884.  
117 Strine, supra note 26. at 2040. 
118 Id. at 2027.  
119 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1885. 
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prospects to pan out120 but should be able to cash out without 
considering the common stockholder, even in cases where the 
preferred did not secure a contractual protection to force a 
liquidation. 121 
In deciding whether the preferred in Trados should be able 
to force a sale that they did not bargain for as a contractual right, 
thus garnering extracontractual protection beyond the fiduciary 
protection offered to all stockholders and beyond the contractual 
protections actually negotiated by the preferred, one should use a 
three pronged analysis. First one should ask where there are 
substantial impediments to bargaining that interfere with the 
preferred’s achievement of their goals. This will rarely be the case 
in the VC context. Second, regardless of any impediments, would a 
law-supplied rule to protect the preferred be cost justified and 
promote value maximization? Third, how does the principal/agent 
analysis help? 
The first prong asks:  is there a total cost minimizing/wealth 
enhancing reason to imply additional protections for the preferred? 
One would first address whether the preferred could have protected 
themselves. Were they beset by the types of collective action 
problems that beset common stockholders? If not, there may be 
little reason to supply a default rule. 
We will assume that most but not all preferred stockholders 
have the clout to protect themselves. Moreover, because legislatures 
provide that preferred stock gets additional protections (rights, 
preferences and limitations) only if expressly bargained for, the 
parties know that they need to bargain for extra-contract protection.  
The second prong asks: even if they lack that clout, does the 
price at which the stock trades reflect the degree of protection 
offered by the contract? If so, that would argue against further 
protecting preferred bought at a discount due to the lack of 
protective provisions.122  Thus, unless the market does not 
accurately reflect the degree of protection particular preferreds get, 
there is no reason to allow the preferred to ignore the effect on the 
common because doing so would ignore the initial bargain and 
force recontracting in future deals.  
                                                 
120 Id. at 1904. 
121 Id. at 1889. 
122 See discussion supra 2-4. 
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Thus, lack of bargaining clout itself would not resolve 
whether additional protection should be implied. One would need to 
know whether the market accurately reflected the lack of protective 
provisions for the preferred. Moreover, protection can exist even 
without legal protection due to the structural protections such as 
board control and staged financing negotiated by preferred.   
The third prong asks whether adding protection for the 
preferred under which the board would have a fiduciary duty to the 
preferred beyond any stipulated contractual terms and beyond the 
fiduciary duties owed to all stockholders (such as not to commit 
waste or divert assets) would ignore the nature of the agent’s 
responsibility to act for all principals to manage assets for the firm. 
Recognizing a non-contractual duty to the preferred as preferred 
would not be helpful in achieving the ultimate goal of maximizing 
value for the firm and thus should not be adopted for that reason. 
There is no reason that adopting it would do any more than offset 
the costs of its adoption. The essence of an agent acting for dual 
principals is to take actions in the best interest of the corporation 
and not to maximize the value for one set of claimants while 
ignoring another set of claimants or the effect on the value of the 
firm.123 Restraining the board’s discretion and carving out a duty to 
the preferred would run counter to the view that agents should be 
able to take actions that harm one set of claimants when such 
actions are in the interest of the corporation. Further, this duty to the 
preferred would unduly hamper the board, forcing it into a 
straightjacket. Creating a judicially supplied rule to protect the 
preferred as preferred would divide up the agent’s responsibilities 
and give one class of claimants—the preferred—the ability to 
restrain any action of the board because it was not in the interest of 
a single claimant. Courts are comfortable supplying a performance 
obligation of the agent because doing so controls an endemic risk 
that is inevitable given the separation of ownership and control. 
This separation is ominipresent but difficult and costly to control by 
                                                 
123 The judicial formulations of fiduciary duty often emphasize the need to act 
for maximizing common stock shareholder wealth as a linguistic shorthand for 
what will best serve the interests of the firm since the risk/return for the common 
stock will generally yield the highest return for the firm. The common 
stockholder is being used to depict the risk/return profile that will yield the 
highest value. The common stock is not being favored as a single claimant when 
its interests would diverge from the firm.  
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contract and because courts intervene because they are convinced 
that the parties would have bargained for the fiduciary obligation 
were it not for transaction costs.  
In Trados, had the court allowed the board to ignore the 
deal’s effect on the common by carving out extra-contractual 
protection or a quasi-fiduciary duty to the preferred that would have 
allowed it to exit, it would have ignored the fact that dual principals 
had both furnished assets to the agent. By endorsing the proposition 
that the board “owes no fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the 
preferred”124 the Trados court was implicitly underlining that an 
agent’s duty is to manage the assets for the firm as a whole.  
Implying a fiduciary duty of the agent to generate value for the firm 
is consistent with that principal/agent model described above. 
However, allowing the preferred to prevail and gain a judicial right 
to exit would ignore the agent’s duty is to the firm itself, not to any 
claimant, preferred or otherwise. The costs imposed on a board 
from a rule permitting it to ignore the common to secure a right not 
bargained for by the preferred that would include a disinclination 
for the common to furnish assets to such agents. That would not be 
value maximizing for the firm. 
Ignoring the effects on the common would overlook the 
basic premise that the principal (here the preferred) sought a type of 
claim that matched its preferences, endowments and beliefs and the 
terms negotiated did not include a right to a forced liquidation. 
Therefore, if the court were to allow the preferred to force a 
liquidation without considering the effect on the common, it would 
be overriding the basic risk/return profile of the initial investment 
whose terms the preferred plaintiffs negotiated.   
The Trados court, while affirming the principle of common 
stock maximization, actually analyzes the board’s role in a way that 
reflects the thesis of this article that, in deciding conflicts between 
investors who might have conflicting interests, the court should 
consider the board an agent with two furnishers of resources and 
two claimants on the pool of assets managed by the agent/board of 
directors. Although recognizing that “it is possible that the director 
could breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests of the 
preferred stockholders over those of the common stockholders,”125 
at the same time, the court gives the board latitude to make 
                                                 
124 Strine, supra note 26, at 2028. 
125 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 42 
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tradeoffs in the best interest of the corporation despite the adverse 
effects on a single class of claimants, including the common 
stockholders. This is clear from both the Trados result itself, 
validating a decision that wiped out the option value for the 
common stockholders, and from the Trados court’s approval of the 
Orban case,126 which involved a similar destruction of value for the 
common stockholders.  
The court recognized the directors’ need “to exercise their 
independent fiduciary judgment” rather than “cater to stockholder 
whim.”127 Under this standard, the board is afforded the discretion 
to determine whether the common’s hope for a future is realistic or 
not. In upholding the board’s right to determine the company’s 
lifespan as an independent entity and to decide on an appropriate 
time to pursue a merger, the court was validating the right of the 
agent overseeing a pool of assets to determine the value of waiting 
and when waiting no longer makes sense.128 Managers of company 
assets are constantly making those tradeoffs determining whether to 
invest now or to take an option on waiting to develop the project 
when more uncertainties are resolved. Although a board must 
consider the effect on the common, they will not be found in breach 
merely because one claimant, a common stockholder, wanted to 
preserve the option of waiting and did not want a merger or exit. 
This opinion upholds the board’s right as an agent managing 
a single pool of assets to manage the pool as it deems is reasonable. 
The Trados court’s affirmation of the Equity Linked principle that 
“they [the board] have every right to send no good dollars after bad 
ones”129 recognizes that the timing of investment and exit decisions 
are complicated decisions that boards have to make. The court in 
Trados, in tracing the board’s decision on why the continuation 
would yield no return for the common, gives latitude to the board 
and rejects the plaintiff’s central argument that the board must keep 
the company alive if the common stockholders wanted that. 
 
                                                 
126 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38. 
127 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38. 
128 See supra note 22 and discussion in Dodge comparing alternative present 
values. 
129 In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 77 (citing Equity Linked, 705 A.2d at 1057). 
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b. Negative Effect on Corporate Value? None where 
contractual protections can be negotiated by the preferred. 
Two critics, Professors Bratton and Wachter, have voiced 
concern that the common stock maximization principle endorsed by 
Trados can make a corporation “less valuable” and result in 
“perverse incentives.”130 Bratton and Wachter are also concerned 
that the case “imposes fiduciary liability on directors who pursue 
enterprise value over suboptimal speculation for the common’s 
benefit.”131  
But if Trados is read properly and if the principal/agent 
model and the vaulting question of determining implied duties 
based on whether adding them will achieve benefits that exceed 
costs are addressed in the case analysis, one can see that Trados 
does not propose that the board must sacrifice enterprise value for 
the common. As Chancellor Strine suggests, Trados stands for the 
proposition “that a traditional duty of loyalty toward the interest of 
the common must be observed and that a preferred controller cannot 
disregard the best interests of the common in its effort to exit its 
investment.”132  
If the preferred were not in control as in Trados, and the 
board decided that the best interest of the firm required that the 
interest of the common be wiped out, one would think that the 
board would have that discretion. No one, not even common 
stockholders, would want a rule preventing certain corporate 
decisions that wipe out the common but are in the best interests of 
the firm. Common shareholders might appear to benefit from such a 
rule, but that kind of rule could make it harder for the firm to access 
financing from banks, debt and preferred stock, which harms 
common stockholders and the firm as a whole. The board is 
generally under a “duty to pursue business strategies benefiting the 
common stockholders” but, at a certain point, that strategy makes 
no business sense and the interests of the firm will be best served by 
declaring bankruptcy. The board may, consistent with its duties to 
the common, “deploy corporate power against its own shareholders 
(the common) in some circumstances-- the greater good justifying 
the action-- but when it does, it should be required to demonstrate 
                                                 
130 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1877. 
131 Id. at 1877. 
132 Strine, supra note 26, at 2039.  
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that it acted both in good faith and reasonably.”133 Thus, the duty 
toward the common does not trump the duty toward the firm and it 
should not prevent a merger that is in the best interests of the firm.  
If the role of the board is traced back to the principal/agent 
model with dual furnishers of resources, the board’s role is one of 
making constant tradeoffs between long term and short term gains, 
and making choices that will not be wealth sacrificing but will all 
fall on a line of non-wealth sacrificing choices, each one of which 
will have a different risk and return profile. If this is the case, then 
the Trados case, even with its emphasis on common stockholder 
wealth maximization, seems to be wealth enhancing rather than “ex 
ante value destroying.”134  
The example given by Bratton and Wachter in which the 
Trados common stock maximization principle will result in a 
sacrifice of enterprise value involves a company which has received 
a $60 million offer. The venture capitalist’s liquidation preference 
is $40 million. They envision two scenarios: one with an upside and 
one with a downside. If the board waits there is a 25% chance of 
getting a better offer of $70 million but a 75% chance of receiving a 
worse $50 million offer. “The expected value of delay [cost] is $55 
million (25% x $70 million and 75% x $50 million)” and Bratton 
and Wachter think that the Trados scrutiny will cause the board to 
misallocate resources to the common because it will prompt the 
board to reject the current $60 million offer and pick the delay since 
that is the only scenario under which the common will have any 
value. Delay will cost the enterprise $5 million.135 Under their view, 
the common stock maximization principle will cause the board to 
pick the option that favors the common (25% of $3 million or 
$750,000) and that is the delay strategy since under the other option 
of cashing out now for $60 million will leave the common $0.  
This example seems fraught with difficulties. First, the 
board would have to compare whether potentially gaining $750,000 
would be worth the potential loss to the common of waiting. There 
is a 75% chance of the company receiving a worse offer of $50 
million under which the common would receive nothing. Bratton 
                                                 
133 Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. 48 LEXIS 48 at 29. 
134 Bratton & Wachter, Theory, supra note 2, at 1886. 
135 Bratton & Wachter, Theory, supra note 2, at 1886 (“delay thus sacrifices $5 
million of enterprise value in exchange for a chance to realize an expected 
$750,000 ($3 million x .25) for the common”). 
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and Wachter seem to think that if there is any chance of the 
common receiving any value, that the board must take that option. 
This does not seem compelled by Trados or by conceptions of the 
role of the agent to tradeoff and weigh options taking into account 
the risk and targeted return of the investor, the value of waiting, the 
uncertainty, other possible options to delay action now, and 
comparing present values of alternative future return stream 
strategies.   
Second, if the preferred had secured a liquidation value as 
well as a contractual right to compel a sale at the liquidation value, 
then there would be no sacrifice of enterprise value.136 The 
preferred could compel the company to sell and there would be no 
delay and no loss of $5 million in value. However, since the 
preferred lacked any contractual right to compel a sale and payment 
of the liquidation value, there would be no sacrifice of enterprise 
value as outlined by Bratton and Wachter. The pricing of the 
preferred stock would be discounted to reflect the fact that the 
preferred lacked a right to compel a sale and the potential loss in 
enterprise value would be priced ex ante. 
Moreover, the concerns over Trados seem overblown given 
the concept of an agent for many classes of claimants with decisions 
being made all the time that are value neutral in terms of the asset 
pool but that have reverberative effect on one class of claimants. 
The board may have a certain offer of $60 million now but the 
timeline of both the preferred and the common is perpetuity and the 
calculations of the cost of waiting/delay might change over time. 
The value of waiting might increase. There might be a 25% chance 
of an offer of $70 million in the near term and a 75% chance of $50 
million in the near term, but there might be other offers if the board 
waited an additional amount of time. In addition, the board might be 
able in this situation to take an option not of delay with no action at 
all but of an option for the $60 million deal.  It might not take the 
$60 million deal right now but might acquire an option on that deal. 
It could exercise the option depending on how the uncertainties 
resolved. If the board were convinced that the delay even with the 
25% chance of $3 million137 would result in a negative effect on the 
                                                 
136 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 2030 (discussing protection offered 
through liquidation provisions). 
137 Bratton and Wachter think that “Delay thus sacrifices $5 million of 
enterprise value in exchange for a chance to realize an expected $750,000 ($3 
million x 2.5) for the common.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1886. 
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asset pool as a whole, perhaps because the waiting would reflect 
negatively on perceptions of the company’s worth (a signal) and the 
board decided that the best option of all the alternatives was to sell 
now to avoid those negative effects, presumably the board could 
choose the $60 million offer without liability.  
Finally, the board might choose the delay even with a 
projected loss of $5 million because of non-monetary returns which 
might lead to an overall greater value for the common than the 
$750,000 figure represents. It might decide that those non-monetary 
returns include the value of keeping the entity alive. Just as a single 
investor without an agent can make tradeoffs including non-
monetary returns that make what would otherwise seem like an 
irrational sacrifice of dollar returns, so too can the agent acting for 
dual investors take non-monetary returns into account in reaching a 
rational/optimal decision for the company.  
The board must be able to decide whether cashing out at $60 
million now is the right course of action for a company with a 
perpetual existence. If an independent board not subject to a conflict 
of interest decided to cash out, would the common have been able 
to complain, alleging that the board must always take steps to 
sabotage the preferred? Probably not—instead, the court would 
likely defer to the board’s ability to determine the timeline for 
liquidating the company rather than second guessing it. 
The second prong of the analysis—cost minimization/wealth 
maximization—also suggests that the Trados result is correct. Had 
the court adopted the view that the preferred should be able to exit 
without considering the effect on the common and be able to do so 
whenever it is advantageous, the court would be bestowing a gift 
that the preferred did not bargain for. This would immediately have 
negative effects on other shareholders that must be accounted for in 
any cost/benefit analysis of the legal intervention. 
Finally, protecting the preferred through a rule saying the 
preferred could exit whenever it was advantageous could have 
negative effects on the capital markets. It could potentially 
negatively affect the ability of issuers to raise capital since investors 
would no longer have any confidence that agents would consider 
the effect on different classes of investors and the firm.   
 
1. Thoughtworks: Calculating the Wealth Effects   
Cases involving preferred stock that pose the question of 
whether to offer judicial protection beyond the contractually 
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negotiated terms should be assessed in two ways: (1) using  the 
framework of the agent (the board) acting for multiple principals 
(classes of investors) in the best interest of the corporation and to 
maximize the value of the equity, and (2) asking the key question of 
whether judicial intervention of a particular type would gain more 
than it costs.  
Without that framework, critics become too easily 
convinced that the case illustrates the bias against preferred 
stockholders.138 Bratton and Wachter criticize the court for 
“stripping away a promise’s contractual validity by remitting the 
decision to perform the promise to pay to the discretion of the 
issuer’s board.”139  
With the framework outlined here, the board of directors 
must manage a corporation with a perpetual existence in the best 
interests of the corporation, even if a particular action adversely 
impacts a particular class of investors at a particular time. 
In Thoughtworks,140 the preferred wanted to force a 
redemption of its preferred stock.141 The board was willing to 
engage in periodic small redemptions of preferred stock but refused 
the large redemption of preferred on the ground that the company 
lacked the necessary cash to meet the requirement of legally 
available funds.142 The preferred challenged that refusal, arguing 
that the certificate of incorporation language entitled the preferred 
to a mandatory redemption since the preferred investor could 
“require [the company] to redeem for cash out of any funds legally 
available therefor . . . .”143 Mandatory redemption provisions of this 
kind are one of the protective provisions preferred stockholders put 
in their preferred stock contracts as a kind of “downside protection 
for the VCs as a way to salvage the remains of an unsuccessful 
                                                 
138 Strine, supra note 26, at 2030 (explaining that Bratton and Wachter see the 
use of the “corporate paradigm” to the exclusion of contract analysis as 
exhibiting such bias). Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1868. 
139 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1860. 
140 SV Investment Partners, LLC v. Thoughtworks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 
2010). 
141 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 979. 
142 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 979–980. 
143 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 982. 
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investment.”144  
The Thoughtworks court consulted both the Delaware statute 
and the Certificate of Incorporation. Del. Ch. 160 provides: “Every 
corporation may purchase redeem, receive, take or otherwise 
acquire…its own shares…”145 That permissive right to redeem 
shares, however, is subject to restrictions that make the redemption 
contingent on the action not impairing the capital of the corporation. 
The Delaware statutory restrictions on redemptions constituted a 
creditor protection against the extreme moral hazard of a 
corporation redeeming all of its stock, leaving no capital at all to 
pay its debt.146  
The preferred stockholders argued that because the company 
had “surplus,” the redemption in the Certificate of Incorporation 
was mandatory since it provided them “the right to have their stock 
redeemed ‘for cash out of any funds legally available therefor.’”147 
However, the court interpreted that language differently from the 
preferred stockholders. First, it found that the term “legally 
available” meant a realistic “available source of cash” rather than an 
accounting finding of a surplus.148 Second, it pointed to a panoply of 
judicial doctrines that constrain a corporation’s “ability to use 
funds, rendering them not ‘legally available.’”149 These doctrines 
prevent a corporation from effecting stock redemptions where the 
effect would be to cause insolvency. Looking at these strictures, the 
court found that the board was within its rights to refuse the 
redemption of the preferred despite the language apparently 
mandating redemption.150  
Preferred stock exists within the larger framework of both 
contractual rights owed to the preferred and the corporate context of 
                                                 
144 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1179. 
145 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 981 (citing 8 Del. C. § 160(a)(1)). 
146 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 973. 
147 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 976. 
148 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 984. 
149 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 985. 
150 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 989 (“The Board's process has been impeccable, 
and the Board has acted responsibly to fulfill its contractual commitment to the 
holders of the Preferred Stock despite other compelling business uses for the 
Company's cash. This is not a case where the Board has had ample cash 
available for redemptions and simply chose to pursue a contrary course.”). 
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the board of directors acting as agent for multiple classes of 
investors. If one focuses only on the contract and the contract 
language, one might criticize Thoughtworks for narrowly 
interpreting the language to “hurt” the preferred.151 But the 
preferred invested and furnished resources to an agent who is 
committed to the best interests of the corporation. Moreover, once 
the value is furnished to the firm by the preferred investor, the asset 
is no longer his. The preferred investor knows that resources from 
other investors with different risk/return profiles will be furnished 
and also knows that its agent, the board, is given plenary 
discretionary decisionmaking with respect to the operation of the 
assets and the firm’s financial matters.  The preferred is halfway 
between common equity, which has a high risk and high return, and 
debt, which has a low risk but low return. If that role is understood, 
then the board of directors, must manage a corporation with a 
perpetual existence in the best interests of the corporation even if a 
particular action adversely impacts a particular class of investors at 
a particular time. Debtholders and preferred stockholders know and 
anticipate that there will be these kinds of wealth effects or transfers 
when they buy the stock or make the loan. Similarly, the preferred 
have chosen to hold a yet different type of claim to match its 
diverse preferences, endowments and beliefs. 
When the company started to flounder and attempts to 
acquire cash to redeem the preferred failed,152 the preferred wanted 
to force a redemption. However, the preferred failed to build in 
more protective provisions to allow them to force an exit such as a 
drag-along right.153 The board had a duty to act in the best interest 
of the corporation. In the context of Thoughtworks, that might mean 
that where a company is subject to volatile cash flows, the board 
might choose to maintain a cash cushion if that was critical for the 
corporation’s existence even if it interfered with the preferred’s 
                                                 
151 See e.g. Bratton & Wachter, Theory, supra note 2, at 1860. Bratton & 
Wachter see Thoughtworks as a “stripping away a promise’s contractual validity 
by remitting a decision to perform from the promise to pay to the discretion of  
the issuer’s board.” They also argue that the denial of redemption rights to the 
preferred would “disables a productive mode of financing.” Id. at 1874. That 
result would only occur if venture capitalists were unable to arrange matters to 
protect themselves through contract or other means (board control, voting 
control, staged financing, etc).  
152 Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 979.  
153 See Thoughtworks, 7 A.3d at 991–992. 
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ability to exit through redemption, unless the preferred specifically 
negotiated for the right to exit on an unrestricted basis.154 In 
addition, since the board has to act to preserve the company’s 
ability to borrow in the future, the board should be able to preserve 
the cash cushion.155 Had the court interpreted the language “funds 
legally available” to permit capital impairment, and in effect gone 
beyond the language and converted the mandatory redemption 
provision that was subject to the qualifying language restricting 
redemption to cases where funds were legally available into a 
provision that would have forced a liquidation of the firm, the court 
would have been ignoring the limiting language and all of the 
associated case law “for the board to use in determining when a 
payment to the preferred is required.”156 Future creditors might 
refuse to lend the corporation needed cash, fearing that even where 
the language subjects the redemption to a condition of having funds 
legally available, the court will force a company to redeem anyway 
as though the preferred negotiated for an unqualified mandatory 
redemption. Even though ex post the preferred want to cash out 
when the company flounders, ex ante the preferred would want the 
board to have the discretion to determine an adequate cash cushion. 
Finally, given the nature of the business, with the major assets of 
the company tied up in the employee compensation for a service 
business, rather than tangible assets, the redemption of the preferred 
stock would have had disastrous consequences, eliminating the 
surplus “even for the purpose of redeeming shares.”157 Thus, a 
decision depriving the board of the discretion to resist a redemption 
when, in the board’s judgment it did not have the funds needed, 
would likely have negative wealth effects.  
                                                 
154 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1227.  
155 Bratton and Wachter would see Thoughtworks as a case where the 
“corporate paradigm trumps the contract paradigm” since they assert that the 
contract language was there and sufficient to protect the preferred and the court 
upended that contractual protection in favor of allowing the board to decide on 
whether there were funds legally available to redeem the preferred stock. 
Bratton & Wachter, Theory, supra note 2, at 1885. However, once the contract 
protection is fully interpreted as a qualified right to redeem, the role of the 
corporate board in deciding on whether sufficient funds existed to redeem the 
preferred can be seen not as trumping the contract since the contract itself 
referenced corporate limits on redemption.  
156 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1227. 
157 Id. at 1198.  
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If one applies the agency model to the facts in 
Thoughtworks, one would argue that as the agent for dual classes of 
shareholders, the agent must be able to resist the demands of one 
class of shareholders—such as a redemption demand—if that 
demand would interfere with the agent’s ability to maintain a viable 
company. The agent must consider the value maximizing effect first 
and never do anything to sacrifice the value of the global firm 
which would not be served by depriving the company of the ability 
to operate once redemption were made to the preferred.  
On appeal, the court held that the board’s determination of 
whether funds were legally available is a matter of business 
judgment.158 In deciding whether to limit the board’s discretion in 
future deals and make the decision not a matter of business 
judgment for the board, and to force redemption when the board 
interpreted the language to preclude redemption, one should 
consider whether that decision would be wealth enhancing or 
whether the costs would more than offset the benefits. A decision 
for the preferred by implying fiduciary protection to limit the 
Board’s discretion would result in an immediate re-contracting 
around the results in future deals. Issuers would insist on protection 
against judicial rewriting of the Certificate of Incorporation and 
expressly negotiate contracts that define legally available to be a 
matter for the board’s business judgment.  
In making this decision, the court should consider whether 
the preferred’s failure to force an exit was a gap or whether ex ante 
the preferred might have decided that the costs of forcing an exit on 
the issuer through a drag-along right was not advantageous because 
of the other effects it might have had on the deal with the issuer. 
Thus, the decision to include the “legally available funds” language 
was done with the full knowledge that it left the preferred 
vulnerable to the board’s discretionary limits. Presumably, the 
parties negotiating these deals are doing so in an ex ante cost 
minimizing way to maximize the gains from trade. They are relying 
on their own estimates of the likelihood of an IPO, their pricing of 
the deal and the protective provisions that it does have, the 
reputational norms that might constrain the board from 
opportunistically gouging the preferred, and other factors. The 
preferred are also presumably deciding to forego other more 
                                                 
158 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 
4.07 (2003). 
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protected investments such as convertible debt. Additionally, they 
may forego a protective provision that gives them the power to 
force liquidation when redemption was sought but refused.159 
 The vaulting question of all judicial interventions is 
whether an implied judicial term such as one limiting the board’s 
right to make determinations about redemption has greater benefits 
than costs. The cost would include the immediate re-contracting 
costs for parties who do not want their boards to be restricted in 
making stock redemption decisions to consider only available 
accounting surplus but also to consider whether cash is realistically 
available to fund a redemption. The cost would also include the 
immediate hit to other outstanding securities that would now be 
subject to the unanticipated and unpriced risks of capital 
impairment needed for creditor protection or perhaps for the future 
growth of the company.  
In cases where there is a wide appreciation of the more 
protective devices available to the preferred, including the drag-
along rights, and other non-contractual rights like staged financing 
and board-control rights, intervention to interpret the term to 
“protect” the preferred would in effect protect the preferred against 
its own risk taking.160 The preferred had other alternatives to taking 
preferred stock, including debt,161 and they presumably traded off 
greater control162 with preferred stock to determine that the risks 
were worth it, despite the potential uncertainties of the company 
and the potential waywardness of the directors and officers. 
Presumably, they made a rational tradeoff given the risks and 
uncertainty, and priced the deal accordingly.163 It was rational 
                                                 
159 Strine, supra note 26, at 2038 (discussing a variety of alternative strategies 
to force a redemption that would be more protective of preferred stockholders).  
160 As Chancellor Strine points out, “the preferred stockholders’ right to 
mandatory redemption in the defendant’s charter was governed by language” 
predicated on available cash. Strine, supra note 26, at 2030. 
161 Strine, supra note 26, at 2032. 
162 With debt, debtholders cannot actively manage a company.  
163 Support for the rationality of the tradeoffs that preferred make can be seen 
in the ways that venture capitalists, one class of preferred, negotiate for 
“controls rights [that] evolve over time….” DOUGLAS CUMMING, VENTURE 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURE, AND POLICIES (ed. 2010).  
Since the preferred are carefully negotiating on control rights, there is reason to 
think that agreement to a redemption right that was qualified was not 
considered. 
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behavior, despite the risk that the mandatory redemption provision 
might not be very meaningful as protection because redemption was 
qualified by the need for legally available funds. Depriving the 
board of the ability to make a judgment about whether funds were 
legally available and deferring to the preferred’s interpretation and 
mandating redemption wherever there was an accounting “surplus” 
might negatively impact the company’s ability to operate after 
making a large redemption payment.164 The ex ante prospect of this 
interpretation would make it more costly to secure financing from 
various investors who would worry that even when there was no 
cash readily available, any finding of a surplus would require that 
the company honor a redemption even if it adversely affected the 
company’s ability to continue operating. A court deciding to ignore 
the case law on “funds legally available therefor” and substitute its 
judgment for that of the board might add to the costs of all 
transactions in the future. There would be the uncertainty of the 
court choosing to ignore language such as “funds legally available” 
that had a meaning defined by precedent.165 In addition, because the 
funds legally available language had been adopted rather than a 
provision forcing a liquidation without constraints, the court would 
be giving the preferred a better deal than they negotiated.  
Looking at Thoughtworks as rendering the preferred 
vulnerable to transfers of wealth to the common ignores the ex ante 
perspective of investors of all types furnishing resources to an agent 
who will manage a pool of assets for the firm. Ex ante, the investors 
will all want the board to have the discretion to act to protect the 
firm’s ability to operate. To deprive the board of the maintenance of 
a cash cushion needed to operate a profitable business would 
presumably depress the market for the firm’s securities and debt of 
a firm. So ex ante the investors, even the preferred, would want the 
board to be able to make decisions to maintain that cushion even if 
ex post, when certain circumstances make a redemption preferable, 
the preferred would choose that outcome despite the adverse impact 
on the ability to operate. Presumably we should be asking whether 
the costs of depriving the board of the ability to make decisions 
about the cash cushion required for a firm to prosper would result in 
a net improvement in wealth.  
Had the Thoughtworks court been willing to ignore the case 
                                                 
164 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1198. 
165 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1227. 
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law precedent meaning of “legally available” and forced a 
redemption on the basis of the preferred’s argument that there was a 
surplus, the court would have been extending a kind of fiduciary 
protection to the preferred. But under the vaulting question 
framework discussed above, it is not clear that the benefits would 
be worth the legal intervention, especially since as Professor 
Charles Korsmo points out “if Thoughtworks attempts to redeem 
the preferred [shares], the surplus no longer exists, even for the 
purposes of redeeming the shares.”166 An effort to protect the 
preferred by interpreting the redemption to be mandatory and 
unqualified might be wasteful and futile. It might also be costly if 
the exact parameters of judicial efforts to protect the preferred are 
uncertain. Moreover, court intervention to make the redemption 
unqualified would restrict the ability of preferred stockholders to 
craft the exact level of protection that they wanted. Had they 
wanted the unqualified right to redemption, they could have easily 
demanded such right. The lesser protection that the preferred 
negotiated in Thoughtworks was presumably priced accordingly. 
Interpreting the provision to give the preferred an unqualified 
mandatory redemption would have ignored the limits imposed by 
the “legally available” qualification and given the preferred more 
than they bargained for contractually. Judicially intervening when 
the preferred have the clout to negotiate or when the preferred buy 
stock that is priced according to the risk undertaken might not 
outweigh the costs of a reduced choice of a spectrum of protection. 
Moreover, the ex ante wealth destroying effects of depriving the 
board, the agent, of the ability to operate the firm using its 
discretion to will preserve the firm’s ability to operate by keeping a 
necessary cash cushion in a volatile business might not be worth the 
particular protection afforded these preferred stockholders. The 
Thoughtworks court situated the decision about the surplus within 
the realm of the board’s business judgment,167 perhaps sensing the 
wealth destroying effects of a contrary decision. 
 
2. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams168 
The conflict between preferred and common stockholders is 
                                                 
166 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1198.       
167 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1198.  
168 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
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likely to be particularly acute when the liquidation preference held 
by the preferred is less than the value of the company if 
immediately liquidated. At that juncture, the common stock would 
like to keep the company going because if the company can 
generate cash flows, the upside will flow to the common stock.169 
However, losses will fall disproportionately on the preferred 
stock170 and they will not benefit from the upside since they have no 
equity interest. 
Equity Linked presented a case involving that type of 
scenario. The biopharmaceutical had “several promising 
technologies” but showed no profit.171 The preferred’s liquidation 
preference was above the value of the company and they wanted to 
liquidate and distribute the proceeds amongst themselves. The 
common, however, sought additional sources of funding to  develop 
the technologies the firm had.172 They successfully secured funding 
from Aries in the form of a $3 million loan, in return for the firm 
issuing a $3 million bridge note accompanied by warrants that 
could be exercised into common stock, making it convertible 
debt.173  
The preferred then sought an injunction against the Aries 
borrowing. The court recognized that this real difference in the 
economic interests of the preferred stockholders and the common 
stock caused a conflict, but the legal issue that formed the preferred 
stockholder’s claim centered on a type of fiduciary duty owed to all 
equity holders in a change of control situation.174 It then proceeded 
to address the legal theories that might allow the preferred to 
challenge the board decision approving the loan transaction.  
The importance of the principal/agent frame for analyzing 
the case and the vaulting question analysis of whether the benefits 
                                                 
169 Id. at 1041. The common stock would keep any residual after claims of 
debtholders and fixed amounts due the preferred had been satisfied.  
170 Id. at 1041. That results because “the current net worth of the company 
would be put at risk in such an effort.” Id.  
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id at 1052. As Walther explains, Genta “obtained convertible debt financing 
from an asset management fund (Aries), conditional on giving Aries the right to 
appoint the majority of the board.” Walther, supra note 75, at 190– 91.  
174 Id. at 1041.  
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of implying the term exceed the costs, given certain assumptions 
about human behavior and the effects of legal rules prospectively 
on behavior. will be examined following a discussion of the facts 
and the court’s legal analysis of the fiduciary duties of the board.  
The essence of the preferred’s argument was that the board 
erred in approving the loan transaction with Aries by not allowing 
the preferred stockholders to bid at an auction for the firm. While it 
recognized that the board’s decision placed “economic risks upon 
the preferred stock,”175 it found no breach of any fiduciary duty 
even though the board’s decision “was taken largely for the benefit 
of the common stock.”176 As equity holders of stock, the preferred, 
like the common, are owed the same fiduciary duties owed to all 
stockholders.177 The court found no breach “of any residual right of 
the preferred as owners of equity.”178 When judging the fiduciary 
duty to holders of equity, the “discretionary judgment is to be 
exercised . . . to prefer the interests of common stock.”179 
In Equity, the particular legal issue that the preferred raised 
was that the board violated its duty to receive the best price in a 
change of control situation.180 The Revlon case imposes that duty 
and is interpreted to forbid a board when choosing between all cash 
offers to choose the lower cash offer.181 The board in Equity was 
choosing to accept the Aries offer or to negotiate with the preferred 
in an auction. If one looks at Equity and thinks about the case in the 
context of dual principals and a single agent operating the firm, it 
makes sense that in interpreting the scope of the agent’s duty to the 
stockholders, that the agent would have no duty to favor the 
preferred merely because that particular claimant wanted to 
liquidate. The agent’s duty is to operate the firm and to manage the 
assets for the firm and its stockholders. However, the agent would 
also be empowered to act in the best interest of the firm by wiping 
out common stockholders in bankruptcy and continuing the firm. 
                                                 
175 Id. at 1042. 
176 Id.  
177 See Jedwab. 
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The board should not be required to fulfill its Revlon duty to allow 
the preferred to bid in an auction (even where the preferred might 
have the highest bid) if the preferred plan to gain control and 
liquidate the company.182 If the courts were to interpret Revlon to 
require the board to favor the preferred, it would be contravening 
the most basic duty of the board to operate the firm to maximize the 
return stream that will be available to various classes of investors 
over the long term.  
The court analyzed the board’s decision by determining 
whether the board owed a duty to preferred claimants and what that 
duty consisted of. The court then analyzed whether there was a 
breach under two different standards of review. The court first 
analyzed the board’s approval of the loan transaction using ordinary 
business judgment rule scrutiny.183 Under that general standard, 
which is applicable to the board’s approval of all transactions, the 
court found the board  
did not therefore breach a fiduciary duty owed to the 
corporation or to any of its equity holders…[since] the board 
was independent; it was motivated throughout by a good faith 
attempt to maximize long term corporate value; and that the 
                                                 
182 705 A.2d at 1040. 
183 The standard of review in stockholder litigation is deferential to the 
directors. To violate their duty of care to stockholders, directors must act in 
violation of the standard of review, which is the business judgment rule. “The 
business judgment rule is a presumption that ‘in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the honest belief 
that the action was taken in the best interest of the company [and its 
shareholders].’” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, *747 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.25 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The 
rationale for the business judgment rule is the reason for a deferential reason of 
care, that “directors are not liable for losses due to imprudence or honest errors 
of judgment.” JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 10.02 (2003). The fiduciary duty of care can be likened to the 
corporate waste standard in stockholder litigation. In Delaware, corporate waste 
is akin to bad faith. Disney, at *748. “In other words, waste is a rare, 
unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give away 
corporate assets.” Id. The deferential standard of review for directors in the duty 
of care context is easily distinguished from the entire fairness standard applied 
in the duty of loyalty context. The duty of loyalty requires that directors use 
their position of trust to further the corporation’s best interest, and not any of the 
directors’ private interests. Id. at *751. In conclusion, the duty of care standard 
of review is much less deferential to directors than that in the duty of loyalty 
context, to which the business judgment rule and waste standard. 
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board and senior management were appropriately informed of 
alternatives available to implement the business plan the 
directors sought to achieve.184 
 
Next, the court recognized the plaintiff’s central argument 
that the board had special augmented duties since there was a 
change in control. Once conceptualized in that way, Revlon duties 
apply to the board and impose a duty “to search for the best 
deal.”185 The court then faced whether a different, more stringent 
standard applied to the board,  which depended on whether the 
Revlon duty applied because it was a change of control case. Revlon 
imposes that duty to search for the best deal which means that when 
choosing between two all cash offers, the board cannot fulfill its 
duties if it chooses the lower cash offer. The court found that it did. 
The court found that even if the more stringent standard of review 
applied, the board’s approval of the loan satisfied the board’s duty 
“to reasonably attempt to advance the interests of the holders of the 
corporation’s equity securities.”186  
The preferred sought a court ordered auction at which the 
preferred would bid. The preferred argued that “the board’s failure 
to offer the preferred an opportunity to meet or exceed the Aries’ 
proposal” meant that the “board failed reasonably to  maximize the 
current value of the firm’s equity.”187 
However, in Equity, the board was not deciding between 
two cash offers. Had the board pursued the preferred offer in an 
auction, they may have outbid Aries. However, the court 
determined that the “preferred’s aim might be simply to liquidate 
the company and take all of the net proceeds and apply it to its 
preference.”188 Thus, the board was weighing the value offered by 
the Aries deal, which included the value of being able to pursue its 
technologies which would permit the company to continue Aries 
owning all common stock so that “its economic incentives are more 
aligned”189 with the board’s long term vision for the company than 
                                                 
184 Id. at 1053. 
185 Id. at 1041. 
186 Id. at 1057.  
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 1057. 
189 Id at 1058. 
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the preferred’s own offer. The agent, the board, must be able to 
determine whether the preferred bidding in an auction for the 
distressed firm would not be in the long term interests of the firm, 
especially when their only interest was in liquidating the firm and 
receiving their preference. In evaluating these offers, the board met 
its enhanced duties triggered by the change of control under Revlon 
to “have the single aim of maximizing the present value of the 
firm’s equity.”190 
Some have attacked the decision refusing to find that a 
fiduciary duty required the board to order the auction requested by 
the preferred as an “ambush” on the preferred and “casts the board 
as a bully.”191 Critics find there is oppression of the preferred and 
that Equity stands for the proposition that “the Board may even 
have a duty to siphon off value from the preferred when the 
opportunity arises.”192 Others, such as Chancellor Strine, think 
denial of the injunction against the loan makes sense since “the 
board owes no fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the preferred 
or to favor  .  .  . the preferred over the common, except when 
contractually required.”193 
The holding of Equity Linked that there is no fiduciary duty 
to favor the preferred as preferred and that when “push comes to 
shove,”194 the board has a duty to favor the common over the 
preferred when exercising discretionary judgment. This makes 
sense under the principal/agent, cost minimizing, value maximizing 
frameworks for the firm analysis articulated here. Under the 
principal/agent framework, the preferred and common both furnish 
resources to an agent who is going to act to further the interests of 
the firm. The agent makes the necessary tradeoffs between present 
and future value, acquiring options on future investment 
opportunities, investing in new projects, and deciding between 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Walther, supra note x, at 190.  
192 Id. at 164. 
193 Strine, supra note 26, at 2028.  
194 Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1176 (“When push comes to shove, any preference 
granted to the preferred stockholders must necessarily come at the expense of 
the common stockholders.”). 
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actions on the contract curve that are not wealth sacrificing. The 
risk return profile of the decisions, however, are different and may 
affect different classes of claimants differently. Under this frame, 
the preferred are not able to argue that there is a duty to favor the 
preferred as preferred beyond the duty owed to all equity 
stockholders. The general linguistic gloss in the case law urging the 
board to favor the common goes back to the duty of the agent to 
foster the long term value maximization of the firm, since the 
interest of the common stock are generally more aligned with that 
goal. 
Under this principal/agent model, it would be strange if the 
Equity court decided that the board’s duty included favoring the 
preferred over the common without taking account of the effect on 
the firm of favoring the preferred over the common. The duty is to 
favor the common over the preferred generally because, given the 
risk return profile of the common, that strategy is thought to favor 
the long term growth of the firm. But that duty to favor the common 
is not without limits and must be read against the background of the 
board’s duty to the firm. Thus, contrary to Professor Walther’s 
suggestion, this Article rejects reading Equity to sanction an 
invariable principle warranting the siphoning of value from the 
preferred to the common. That reading of Equity would violate the 
agent’s duty to the firm and thus would not pass muster.  
Alternatively, if the board were under a duty to sabotage the 
preferred from day one (as Professor Walther alleges Equity does) 
to subtract value from the preferred in favor of wealth transfers to 
the common, would that pass muster? Would the duty to favor the 
common mean that the board must carefully scrutinize the contract 
terms of the preferred and use various techniques like subsidiary 
mergers195 to reduce the power of the preferred.196? Although critics 
suggest that the board is incentivized by Equity Linked to “siphon” 
off value from the preferred, in fact, the board’s fiduciary duty is to 
manage assets to maximize the value of the firm. In most cases, this 
duty will mean favoring the common over the preferred. But 
presumably, it would be a violation of the board’s duty to siphon off 
                                                 
195 DAVID FEIRSTEIN, PRACTICIONER NOTE: PARENTS AND SUBSIDIARIES IN 
DELAWARE: A DYSFUNCTIONAL STANDARD, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 479, 481-487 
(2006). 
196 Another technique would be to use its power to refuse to grant the preferred 
concessions in the express terms designed to prevent such wealth transfers. 
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value from the preferred from day one to the preferred regardless of 
whether that wealth transfer was in the interest of the firm. For 
similar reasons, it would be a violation of the board’s fiduciary duty 
if it decided that it would never act against the common even if it 
were in the best interests of the firm. For that reason, we assume it 
would be a violation to conclude that the board must elect to 
sabotage the preferred if there is any chance of helping the 
common. Sabotaging the preferred is only allowed if it is the best 
long-term interest of the firm.  
Conducting the firm’s business to always sabotage the 
preferred would deprive management of the ability to perform 
certain actions such as effectuating an out of court restructuring to 
dilute the existing common shareholders and replace them with new 
common shareholders, even when doing so was in the best interest 
of the firm. It should not be harder for the board to manage the 
corporation so it can survive as an entity. Were the board to act in 
that manner, and engage in any action to disfavor the preferred and 
to favor the common, the board would be violating its fiduciary 
duty to manage the resources of the claimants for the best interests 
of the firm. Moreover, depriving the board of the discretion to take 
actions in the interests of the firm, even when claimants are 
adversely affected, would be wealth destroying rather than wealth 
enhancing. The agent is being hired to exercise its business 
judgment, not to favor one class of claimant regardless of the 
effects on the firm. Moreover, the costs of interpreting fiduciary 
duty to allow the board to always act to disfavor the preferred and 
to favor the common is a rule that would be dispreferred by 
common stockholders since it might make it harder to get financing 
from banks and from preferred stock. Moreover, banks and 
debtholders, as well as many preferred stockholders, would not 
prefer an interpretation of fiduciary duty that mandates wealth 
transfers to common, as it would wipe out the firm’s value.  
The critics who see Equity Linked as an abuse of preferred 
stockholders197 seem to remove the conflict from the principal/agent 
context in which the agent is tasked with the operation of the firm. 
The agent must be able to wipe out the common if it is in the firm’s 
best interests or similarly be able to take actions that hurt the 
preferred if that it is in the firm’s best interest. 
Viewing Equity Linked through the principal/agent lens 
                                                 
197 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 20. 
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helps one to understand why the case’s outcome makes sense. It 
also helps to rule out the more extreme readings of what conduct 
would be allowable under the court’s holding. Contrary to 
Walther’s suggestion, the decision cannot be read as requiring the 
board to siphon value from the preferred “whenever an opportunity 
arises.”198  
This article’s analysis also helps to make sense of the case. 
The court holding can be read as a decision which refuses to impose 
an additional fiduciary duty on the board to favor the preferred at 
point in time they want to exit. But since the preferred could easily 
have negotiated for a provision that would have forced liquidation 
in such circumstances, there do not seem to be compelling reasons 
to adopt it, especially since that adoption would have a negative 
effect on the other securities of the issuer that would be subject to 
this additional non-bargained for protection,thereby making the 
costs of adoption greater than its benefits.  
 
 
Section V. Non-VC cases where Obstacles to Bargaining Are 
Formidable: A Different Approach For Preferred Stockholders 
  
There are other situations outside the VC context where the 
barriers to negotiating contractual protections for the preferred are 
much more substantial. Therefore, the general rule that preferred 
stockholders must depend exclusively on negotiated contractual 
protections seems problematic, especially where the shares are not 
publicly traded. Preferred stockholders in the VC context can 
presumably bargain for all the protections they want, and are 
compensated for any additional risk by the lower market price or 
higher dividends even if they do not have contractual protections. 
Preferred stock is often issued where the holders have no 
direct bargaining power and there is no underwriter massaging the 
terms on their behalf. The legal adjudicator must recognize that the 
barriers to self-protection through contractual provisions may be 
significantly greater than if the preferred shares were issued to a 
sophisticated counterparty in a VC financing or in financing 
preferred arrangement.  
These other settings in which preferred stock is issued 
suggest that an adjudicator should analyze the legal intervention 
                                                 
198 Walther, supra note 77, at 164. 
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differently depending on the particular context of the preferred 
stock. Even with a lack of clout or no direct negotiation and no 
underwriter, legal intervention for the preferred may not be 
efficient. If you have sophisticated buyers and publicly traded 
preferred shares, then even without the power to negotiate 
contractual protections, the market price can correctly value the 
weaknesses of the particular express terms. In such cases, the 
market price discount will achieve the ultimacy of maximizing the 
gains from exchange. What the preferred give up in express 
contractually negotiated provisions because they lack bargaining 
power will be compensated for in the exchange by a lower price for 
the shares.  
In other instances, there might not be publicly traded 
preferred shares. If the preferred do not have the opportunity to 
negotiate directly and there is no market trading price accounting 
for weaknesses in contractual protections because the stock is not 
publicly traded, then the intervention analysis would be different.  
For example, imagine that a father owns a real estate 
development company. The parents have five children, three sons 
and two daughters.  The sons all follow Dad into the business while 
the daughters marry and start different careers. Dad sets up his 
estate plan to give the sons common stock and the daughters 
preferred stock, giving them a stream of dividends and providing 
for mandatory redemption/buyout terms and thinks that the 
daughters are protected.  Then Dad dies and the common stock 
gives the sons absolute control. They enrich themselves through 
inflated salaries and spin off of assets to themselves which Dad did 
not adequately guard against with express contract terms for the 
preferred.  
This scenario raises the question of whether the daughters, 
as holders of preferred shares, should have any claims against the 
sons, and under what legal theory. For example, should the 
daughters get any additional protections beyond the negotiated 
contract terms of the preferred stock and beyond the fiduciary 
duties owed to all stockholders? Or are they limited to what the 
contract provides?199 
Whether the law should intervene to supply an additional 
                                                 
199 The normal rule applicable to preferred shares relegates the preferred to 
their contractual rights unless the preferred can demonstrate a violation of a duty 
owed to all stockholders. See Jedwab. 
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fiduciary duty to the preferred as preferred in the real estate 
development case to protect the daughters holding preferred stock 
should depend on whether this type of law-supplied rule would 
maximize welfare. That depends on whether the particular 
suggested intervention—expanding the performance obligation to 
create protection for the preferred as preferred—would achieve the 
ultimacy of maximizing gains without negative offsetting effects. If 
the daughters demonstrate that the sons have control and used it to 
deplete the company’s assets, that may constitute a waste of assets 
and the daughters would be able to recover under the fiduciary duty 
owed to all stockholders, including preferred, under Jedwab, and 
intervention to create additional fiduciary protection might not be 
needed. Similarly, if the daughters can protect themselves through 
the implied covenant of fair dealing applicable to all contracts, the 
costs of the law intervening with a special protective fiduciary duty 
may not be efficient.  
To determine if the law should imply a fiduciary protection 
provision for the preferred stockholder daughters, one needs to ask 
whether the imposition of this additional duty, not bargained for, 
would cause harm to the remaining common stockholders. If so, it 
would not be value maximizing. In cases involving sophisticated 
investors who bought and negotiated claims that met their 
risk/return profile, adding fiduciary protection ex post would 
change the risk/return value for the future returns of the common 
stockholders in ways that could not be anticipated,200 saddling them 
with the additional burden of the fiduciary duty for the preferred. 
This would give the preferred more protection than they actually 
paid for and ensure them a higher return than the risk/profile 
associated with their purchase of preferred stock.  
However, these projected costs to the common stockholder 
are a negative effect of adding a fiduciary protection for the 
preferred. It seems less compelling or non-existent where the stock 
is created as part of an estate plan and the children are being given 
stock.201 The argument that adding fiduciary protection will cause a 
                                                 
200 See Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 20, at 160 n.19.The hit to the 
common from additional protection to the preferred would be unanticipated 
since the essential nature of the preferred investment is that all protections must 
be contractually negotiated or they will not be recognized.  
201 A different calculus would obtain where the insider paid to acquire stock 
from the parent/owners.  
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hit to a class of stockholder (such as the common stockholder) who 
purchased on the assumption that the preferred would be afforded 
no protection beyond the contractual terms seems less compelling, 
since in the case of a gift to the common, they did not negotiate the 
terms of their investment. Even where the insider pays for the 
common stock, it is really a gift202 though structured differently for 
tax reasons and not a third party negotiated transaction. And since 
the common stock insiders did not invest dollars, it is hard to posit a 
hit to their investment by a change in the risk/return for the 
common from implying a duty on the part of the board to the 
preferred stockholders.  Moreover, in such cases, adding additional 
fiduciary protection for a class of preferred from the Board might be 
welfare maximizing because (1) it might disincentivize common 
stockholders from depleting the assets of the company, (2) might 
disincentivize them from acting opportunistically, (3) doing so 
would not result in a hit to an investment purchased on a certain 
risk/return profile or assumptions about the limits of protection for 
the preferred, and (4) the common stock insiders might anticipate 
that family members would owe extra obligations to other family 
members so that even if the common stockholders paid for the 
stock, they presumably paid for the stock with the anticipation that 
they would not be able to enrich themselves through inflated 
salaries and spin-off of assets to themselves to the detriment of their 
family members (sisters) holding preferred stock. The fourth point 
reinforces the concept that “[s]hifts of wealth in favor of” one class 
of claimants can occur only where the parties “do not perfectly 
anticipate future wealth shifting probabilities…”203 Where the 
common stockholder can anticipate that a court would police 
against and protect preferred stockholders in the family setting, the 
wealth shifting would be anticipated and priced into the investment. 
Thus, no loss in wealth from a rule protecting the preferred through 
a good faith obligation. 
 Another case in which the ordinary rule relegating 
preferred to their contractual protections and denying all fiduciary 
protection to the preferred should be questioned occurs in public 
preferred stock context. Once the initial stock is sold and then 
resold, there is no opportunity for the subsequent purchasers of 
                                                 
202 It might be structured differently for tax reasons.  
203 Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 20, at 173. 
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preferred stock to negotiate any contractual protections.204  The 
company may have normal public finance preferred stock terms 
from a deal in which a "blue chip" placement agent found more than 
fifty large institutional purchasers; the debentures were 
subsequently registered for public resale and have been resold into 
both bond mutual funds and to individuals of unknown 
sophistication or wealth.  Thus, it may not make sense for those 
holders to rely on the contract protections negotiated at the initial 
sale, particularly in cases where the market might not signal the 
lack of protection through a discount.  
This case is illustrated by a company investing in a new line of 
products. For example, as a direct result of the normal business 
operations seeking to improve product performance, the 
management team discovers a concept for a potential new product 
line of Wowies, a small RFID device that tracks the location of the 
company's products geographically (where on Earth) and spatially 
(how high off the earth) and monitors the efficiency of the products 
in use. Wowies, if affixed to all of the company's products, would 
allow the company to track the usage of their products throughout 
their life cycle, allowing the company to better service the 
customers by recommending repairs, maintenance, and, ultimately 
replacement. And the firm sees value maximizing potential, since it 
could enable the company to sell its products for increased prices. 
Wowies would also be useful to many other manufacturers. There 
would be no more guess work about how customers are 
using/abusing products like airplanes, trains, buses, trucks and 
automobiles.  If first to the market, the company could transform its 
business from aerospace manufacturing to information technology.  
Development of Wowies is clearly outside the primary skill 
set of the company's managers, and although the company's 
research engineers include folks who can initiate the Wowie 
development, they must be supplemented by new specialists.  It is 
also going to be hugely expensive, and may even threaten the 
company in the near term.  It will however, drain the company's 
cash resources to a degree that could threaten the company's 
ongoing business flexibility, reduce the amount of dollars available 
for research and development of its aerospace parts and could, in 
the worst case, threaten its survival in an aerospace cyclical 
                                                 
204 Even preferred stock issued by large private companies can resemble these 
characteristics of public preferred.  
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downturn, which happens fairly frequently. The charter provides, as 
normal, that the corporation may engage in any lawful act or 
activity that corporations may be formed for.  There are no specific 
covenants in the preferred stock terms covering changes in business 
model. The preferred has a liquidation preference over the common 
stock, and various rights of redemption and class voting rights, none 
of which are triggered by a change in the business model 205(one 
potential basis for a class vote is eliminated because the company's 
"purpose clause" is broad enough to preclude the need to amend the 
charter). 
So far, this example illustrates a potential risk to the 
company from entering a new  venture with little background and a 
largely uncertain payoff. The company has a few large common 
shareholders who control the company's voting power and the 
Board.  There are several independent directors, people who have 
social relationships with management and/or the large shareholders 
but also some who were found through normal director search 
mechanisms in advance of a possible IPO.  
The Corporation has issued a $10,000,000 liquidation 
preference of preferred stock and has $10,010,000 in net assets, 
sufficient to pay off the preferred in liquidation and leaving $10,000 
for the common.  Carl Icahn has bought common for $10,000, as an 
option on a corporate recovery.   
The controlling common shareholders look at the business 
opportunity and decide that it is worth taking. The board decides 
that the risk/reward of throwing money at the new idea justifies 
spending 90% of the company's profits on the new venture, instead 
of stockpiling half of those monies to cover business downturns, 
because the business move is the only way to create value for the 
common and for the firm, but risks the preferred’s recovery.  If 
successful, they may have a new Google and in worst case they 
lose, the company goes bankrupt. But the company thinks it is more 
likely to  suffer some hard times during the next (inevitable) 
business downturn. The company has a virtually zero chance of 
bankruptcy absent this decision; it has a dominant, near monopoly 
on a key part common to all aircraft, and has a strong track record 
of incremental growth over 75 years.  The role of the board is to 
                                                 
205 If this were an early stage venture capital scenario, there is virtually zero 
chance that the preferred stock would have not specific protection against 
changes in the business model.  
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identify opportunities that will provide long term growth through 
investment in new ventures, but also to be prudent and avoid taking 
gambles that will bankrupt the company.  
A few years later, the company goes bankrupt because the 
sudden advent of an adverse business cycle. The company is unable 
to meet its debt obligations as they are due (its refinancing sources 
dried up, and its cash reserves had been sunk into the development 
of Wowies, which have not yet paid off).  There are sufficient assets 
to pay off the company's debt, but the preferred gets nothing. Can 
the preferred sue the board for breach of fiduciary duty? 
This type of fact pattern raises a horizontal conflict between 
the preferred and the common.206 The ordinary view is that there is 
no special duty to the preferred as preferred and that the preferred 
have to depend on its contractual protections or price downward for 
greater risk. But where the ability to build in contractual protections 
is not realistic, one begins to question whether the principle of 
common value maximizing is best for the firm. This may be the 
precise case where no rational investor would view the investment 
in a positive way and would view any investment in such a new 
venture as reckless. Only when looked at exclusively from the 
perspective of the common does the investment appear rational, 
especially when the chances of success are very low and may 
precipitate the firm’s bankruptcy.  
In this kind of case it is difficult to put a real value on 
proceeding with the investment for the firm. There is no track 
record. There is great uncertainty as to whether another 
entrepreneur will beat the firm and invent its own version of 
Wowie. So valuation in such cases is a matter of guesswork. Of 
course, the firm could get a valuation done but it may not be 
accurate or realistic. Here, the company is proposing to invest its 
own money so its valuation is not likely to be nearly as accurate as 
when someone proposes to newly invest in such a venture.  
In such a case, where contract protections are not realistic 
because of the lack of a real opportunity to negotiate for terms and 
                                                 
206 It may seem like an unlikely scenario since a large established company 
would seem to have other avenues for raising the necessary dollars other than 
through issuing preferred stock. Normally, such an established company could 
borrow money through a bank loan. However, the bank may be reluctant to lend 
when the business model changes, thus necessitating the resort to preferred 
stock. 
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the market’s inability to account for the risk may be non-existent 
due to the stock being held in a mutual fund where the lack of 
protective terms may not be salient enough to affect the price. More 
importantly, as discussed earlier, the stock price may not reflect the 
lack of protection for the preferred stockholder for an important 
reason. The preferred stockholder may fail to discount the price 
paid for the stock. Even though the stock agreement might lack 
protections, the preferred stockholder has other protections. Thus, 
he will only fund in stages207 and the lack of contract protection will 
not cause the initial purchaser to discount the price, causing the 
later purchaser to buy a price that does not fully reflect the lack of 
protection. Moreover, even if the initial agreement contains 
protections and the preferred stockholder pays a price to reflect 
those protections, those protections may be negotiated in a side deal 
between the VC preferred stockholder and the founders or between 
a company and a preferred share investor in a side deal whose terms 
do not find their way into the express terms of the preferred. So, the 
VC’s agree to certain terms (voting power, dividends, conversion, 
liquidation, etc.) that will live on always and forever, and these are 
in the amendment to the article of incorporation or certificate of 
designation (Delaware) and can only be later changed with the 
requisite shareholder vote and also may require board approval if 
that is a state law requirement.  
 Shareholder agreements, however, routinely provide for 
additional terms between the contracting parties.208 These could 
include registration rights, for example, requiring the issuer to file a 
                                                 
207 See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of 
Venture Capital, 59 The J. of Fin. 1461 (1995)(discussing staged financing as a 
protective device for venture capital). 
208 One might ask why not put these terms into the charter? Because they are 
often complex, and usually viewed as personal to the party demanding them, not 
something that any and all unknown strangers should be given them. Here is an 
example of a clause in a Stock Purchase Agreement that would keep the benefit 
of the protection personal as between the original contracting parties: “This 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT dated as of November 23, 2015, (this 
Agreement) is made and entered into by and among Pro Star Freight Systems 
and Pro Star Truck Center Third Party Beneficiaries. This Agreement is solely 
for the benefit of the parties hereto and no provision of this Agreement shall be 
deemed to confer upon third parties, either express or implied, any remedy, 
claim, liability, reimbursement, cause of action or other right.” See 
htttps:www.lawinsider.com/usage/third-party-beneficiaries-clauses-uses-in-
stock-purchase-agreement. Last visited 9/02/16.  
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registration statement with the SEC. But others may include 
negative covenants or even positive covenants affecting the makeup 
of the Board, or rights of first refusal, or other rights personal to the 
VC’s. Some of these rights may be transferable, but others may not 
except by operation of law (merger, for example). These 
shareholder agreements will not transfer to subsequent purchasers 
of the preferred stock.  
This means that the price of the securities should be higher 
to reflect less risk due to protections such as staged financing or 
contractual protections that sophisticated market participants have 
that other subsequent buyers will not have.  
With subsequent purchasers who lack the original 
protections that the VC’s have one needs to determine whether the 
lack of protections will be priced into the securities of subsequent 
purchasers. It will be lower than the price paid by the original 
purchasers. If the market is pricing in the lack of such protections, 
then arguably there is no need for fiduciary protections for the 
subsequent purchasers as they will pay a discounted price. This 
would be true under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis under 
which the pricing of a security reflects “all available information 
about the security.”209  
If there is a well developed and thick market for preferred 
shares, and if all subsequent purchasers will lack the original 
protections then the market price to those purchasers should reflect 
the lack of such protections.  
However, the disciplining and market pricing effects may be 
attenuated for two reasons. First, the market for preferred stock may 
be harder to price and not as efficient as the market for common 
stock.210 If that is the case, and if the market pricing is less efficient, 
then there may be a greater need for a fiduciary protection for the 
subsequent purchasers of preferred stock.  
Even if market pricing of the stock for subsequent 
purchasers of preferred stock is accurate, if everyone involved 
would still want a limited fiduciary obligation of the kind suggested 
in this article, there might be reason to adopt it as a majority 
                                                 
209 Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure p. 21 
(2016)(forthcoming IOWA LAW REVIEW). See also Eugene T. Fama, Efficient 
Capital Markets, A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 
(1970). 
210 See Valuation Issues With Respect to Preferred Stock. Cite needed. 
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preferred default rule. The initial VC entrepreneurs would 
conceivably lower their cost of capital if people would pay more for 
preferred stock with a limited fiduciary protection. Preferred 
investors would presumably like the protection against 
expropriation.  
However, to justify an implied term of limited fiduciary 
protection suggested here, one must ask why don’t issuers include 
the protections voluntarily? If such limited fiduciary protections 
would add value, presumably investors would be willing to pay for 
them and companies that did not offer them would be at a 
competitive disadvantage and would have a higher cost of capital. 
The answer is that the initial holder of preferred stock (the VC’s) 
have other protections that render fiduciary duty protection 
superfluous. So the initial VC’s and issuers won’t include them and 
if subsequent purchasers trade in a relatively inefficient market 
where the price signals are attenuated and do not accurately reflect 
the lack of protections, limited fiduciary protection might be 
justified.  
 
Another issue that might impact the accurate pricing of the 
lack of fiduciary protections for the subsequent purchasers is the 
costliness of getting that information to the market. As Professors 
Gilson and Kraakman have argued, “information costs determine 
how widely particular information is distributed in a market, and 
therefore the relative efficiency of the market mechanism that 
incorporates it into the price.”211 
 
In the case of a company that issues initial stock to large 
institutional investors and then registers those securities for public 
resale, or when stock initially sold to VC’s is then later resold to 
later purchasers, the fundamental question is whether the market 
will take account of the lack of fiduciary protection as an element of 
the pricing at the resale point. Initially, the institutional investors or 
VC’s have other means of protecting themselves that cause them to 
not discount the stock for lack of any fiduciary protection. But 
when the securities are resold, the market would have to focus on 
the lack of fiduciary protection as a new piece of information 
                                                 
211 Ronald J. Gilson and Reiner Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the 
Financial Crisis: It’s still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313,  
330 (2014). 
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justifying a repricing of the securities. But since the ordinary rule is 
a lack any fiduciary protection for preferred, the market may fail to 
price that even though the fact that the public investors are buying 
the stock without other protective devices such as staged financing, 
may make the lack of such fiduciary protection a more important 
factor. However, it may remain non-salient due to its background as 
the ordinary rule which denies fiduciary protection to preferred. In 
addition, the market would have to account for the fact that the 
protective provisions that extended to the initial purchasers are no 
longer available to the public investors. The market may have 
difficulty pricing the fall off or absence of initial protections that 
may make the absence of fiduciary protection more critical.  
 
A key argument that supports the imposition of a limited 
fiduciary duty in the particular context of publicly traded preferred 
shares goes back to Professors Merill and Smith. They argue that 
when information costs are too great, there are great reasons to 
adopt standardization and limit individually crafted terms. At other 
times, when the information costs are lower, the benefits of 
customization may outweigh the benefits of standardization. They 
argue that the “numerus clausus [limiting the creation of new 
property rights] strikes a rough balance between the costs of 
frustrating parties’ objectives on the one hand and the costs of 
complicating third party information gathering.”212 
 
Courts will be drawn to “recast new interests as “one of the 
recognized forms”213 Courts hesitate to recognize new property 
rights and embrace standardization due to the information costs that 
courts “must expend to determine the attributes of the rights…”214 
Standardization saves on these information costs. 
 
These information costs similarly can help explain why 
standardization in the form of a limited fiduciary duty may make 
sense since the benefits of customization and individually crafted 
protections would be outweighed by information costs. The 
information costs are those identified earlier, namely the costs of 
                                                 
212 Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE. L. J. 1, XX (2000). 
213 Id. at 1.  
214 Id. at 8. 
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the subsequent purchasers and third parties of determining that the 
lack of fiduciary protection is a new piece of information justifying  
a repricing of the securities given the absence of transferable 
customized protections such as staged financing not available to the 
subsequent purchasers. On the other hand when sophisticated VC’s 
are involved, the benefits of customization will outweigh the costs 
of information so it will make sense to restrict the original VC 
purchasers of preferred stock to their contracts.  
 
Thus, it might make sense to create a limited fiduciary duty 
to protect against (1) intentional destruction of the value for the 
preferred and (2) against reckless investment. As one colleague 
pointed out, my proposal applies a deferential duty of care standard 
to a specific species of duty of loyalty context where the board’s 
self-interest problems are not necessarily as acute as in other duty of 
loyalty contexts where the directors are alleged to be favoring 
themselves. Thus the stringent intrinsic fairness standard that would 
normally apply seems inapt.215 
 
Implying such limited fiduciary obligations would create 
value by discouraging reckless investment behavior. Such a limited 
right would not decrease the value of the firm or add to transaction 
costs. It would not put the board in the position of balancing the 
interests of the stockholders in a way that might lead to a standstill 
or discourage prudent risk taking by agents. Would simply rule out 
investments that would be considered grossly irrational unless they 
are evaluated solely from the perspective of the common 
stockholder who has already lost the bet on the company. One could 
look to other contexts such as insurance companies, which are 
limited to legal investments as a standard by which to judge 
whether the investment was grossly irrational. 
Why imply such an obligation? First, the parties may not be 
able to contract on a solution to reckless action by the board, as 
explained below; the contracting difficulties are just too great. 
Second, the parties who buy preferred subsequently in mutual funds 
                                                 
215 There may be some overlap with the idea of a conflict of interest, that of a 
common controlled board favoring the common stockholders over the preferred 
stockholders but when it is in the best interest of the firm, not simply in favor of 
the common stockholder interest. 
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had no opportunity to bargain for contractual protection against a 
change in business and other types of contractual protections, such 
as a right to a put216 whenever the preferred wants to exit would not 
be enforceable. Even if there were an opportunity to bargain, 
unsophisticated parties might assume that a specific contractual 
protection would be unnecessary. They might assume that boards 
constrained to act for the firm could not act recklessly and thus 
would not include a provision. Third, the alternative protection of 
buying at a discount may not work because the unsophisticated 
buyer would not know how to assess the risk of the lack of fiduciary 
protection against waste and reckless investment and thus market 
would not price the risk accurately. Finally, for the reasons 
discussed earlier, the pricing signals may be attenuated and thus one 
cannot depend on market pricing to give the subsequent purchaser 
an accurate signal of the true value of the stock given its lack of 
contractual protections.  
 
The counterargument to implying a fiduciary duty is that 
once a fiduciary duty is imposed ex post, the other claimant, the 
common stock, is saddled with a new and unanticipated 
obligation.217 That adds costs and thus implying the obligation 
would not necessarily result in lower total costs.  Here, if there is a 
broad obligation to refrain from acting recklessly parties against the 
preferred in a limited set of contexts where the preferred could not 
contractually protect themselves, would there be a reaction by the 
common to immediately recontract around the result and to include 
language in future deals to expressly allow the board to act 
recklessly against the preferred?  
In order to determine the recontracting costs, one must focus 
on the two junction points at which parties buy preferred stock and 
the role of the common stockholders. At the initial purchase, the 
common stock would buy the common bought stock on the 
expectation that the board could act recklessly against the preferred 
and the preferred would have bought on that assumption paid a 
                                                 
216 The owner of a put option has the right to sell an underlying security at a 
specified price within a specified timeframe, and often to a specified buyer. 
217 It would be unanticipated under the general rule that the only duties to the 
preferred are to honor the terms of the contractual agreement with the preferred 
and the duty owed to all stockholders (enforceable through a derivative action) 
to refrain from wasting corporate assets or to engage in self-dealing.  
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discounted price to reflect that lack of fiduciary protection. 
However, the unsophisticated investor buying preferred stock has 
no ability to contract over such matters and the buyer of public 
preferred may not know enough to deal with the risk of the lack of 
fiduciary protection.  The public buyers of such preferred stock 
know that they do not know enough. Thus the underwriters will 
have to knock the price down even further to cause them to buy 
such stock. Thus, imposing a restraint against such behavior would 
not depress the value of the firm or add to recontracting costs. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that had the unsophisticated 
buyers of preferred been able to bargain for an implied obligation 
against reckless action against the preferred they would have done 
so or would have decided not to purchase or would have paid a 
highly discounted price.  
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the lack of protection 
against waste might not be priced into the price of the stock 
initially, especially where the preferred stockholders have other 
protections such as staged financing. This may make the pricing of 
the stock inaccurate as the preferred stockholder will ignore the lack 
of protection against waste due to other non-contractual devices for 
protection. 
If the price does not reflect accurately the risk the 
subsequent preferred is taking, and there is no implied fiduciary 
protection of any kind, then the preferred must depend on the 
contract. However, for reasons outlined below, there are reasons to 
question whether a contract solution makes sense. One reason for 
questioning the contract solution to the situation of directors 
favoring the common by pursuing a reckless option is that the party 
(the corporation) in certain public preferred is that contracts with 
the preferred holders (through selling the shares) is not the 
perpetrator or beneficiary of the "wrongful behavior" if there is 
any.  The "wrongdoers" are the directors, and the beneficiaries of 
the "wrongdoing" are the common holders.  But neither the 
common holders nor the directors are in privity with the preferred 
shareholders. So there is a contract attempting to limit "wrongful" 
behavior by people (the directors) that the entity does not control 
(indeed, it is the one controlled by the wrongdoers and their 
beneficiaries).  And the alternative suggestion for a contract 
solution in which the preferred can require the directors and 
common holders to sign on as guarantors would not occur in the 
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public corporate finance setting.218  
Contract solutions are also problematic because the 
"wrongful" action by the directors may be irreversible, and the 
negative impact on the preferred may result in the destruction of the 
entity's entire value so that payment of damages by the entity to 
restore the status quo ante is impossible.  And if the Hail Mary 
investment fails, the common will not actually receive any benefits, 
so there is nothing to recoup from them even if a viable cause of 
action could be found (if the Hail Mary succeeded, there would be 
no complaint by the preferred since the assets were not lost).  And 
absent finding a fiduciary duty owed to the preferred, there is no 
direct claim against the directors. 
Although there is no special "self-dealing" other than 
benefitting common shareholders in general, the Board recognizes 
that the preferred shares are taking the same risk as the common 
(buffered to a small degree by the value of the common), but will 
receive no direct reward for the new venture. And although the 
preferred took that risk when they bought stock without the upside 
that the common would have, they risk that the agent will act to 
benefit the common at their expense. This risk of adverse action is 
magnified when the ability to negotiate contractual protections is 
assumed not to be possible.  
There is also the problem that the "wrongful" action by the 
directors may be irreversible, and that the negative impact on the 
preferred has resulted in the destruction of the entity's entire value, 
so that payment of damages by the entity to restore the status quo 
ante is impossible.  And if the Hail Mary failed, the common did 
not actually receive any benefits, there is nothing to recoup from 
them even if a viable cause of action could be found (if the Hail 
Mary succeeded, one the other hand, there would be no complaint 
by the Preferred since the assets were not lost).   
And absent finding a fiduciary duty owed to the preferred, 
there is no direct claim against the directors, perhaps the only 
solution to this situation might be to imply a fiduciary duty to the 
preferred. That would protect the preferred against reckless 
behavior by the board. It would be harder to argue on these facts 
that the preferred should be relegated solely to contract protections 
where many preferred bought after the initial issuance and the 
opportunity to negotiate for protection against reckless behavior 
                                                 
218 Interview with M&A lawyer. 
 Page 76 
would be non-existent. Even if you argue that the preferred who 
bought subsequently should discount the price to reflect the absence 
of protection against reckless behavior, the preferred would not 
have thought there was a need to discount the purchase price for the 
stock since unsophisticated purchasers might assume that the board 
is constrained from reckless behavior, and therefore they might pay 
a price premised on non-reckless behavior by the board or knowing 
that they do not know enough would be reluctant to buy until the 
price was knocked down even below the price that reflects the lack 
of fiduciary protection against reckless investment.   
 Finally, implying a limited fiduciary duty of against 
reckless action (such that no reasonable investor would take looking 
at the valuation question for the firm in an objective fashion and not 
solely from the perspective of the common) would incentivize 
investment. Otherwise, investors in preferred stock who buy in the 
secondary market with no opportunity to negotiate contractual 
protections will be wary of investing.  
 One objection is that this proposal would require judges to 
make case by case determinations as to whether fiduciary review is 
appropriate. There are normally costs associated with judicial 
determinations that are contextually based but in this case, the judge 
would be looking at readily ascertainable factors. The judge would 
need to first determine whether the stock was issued in the family 
context where the preferred were family members who lacked the 
ability to negotiate the terms of an illiquid security. Second, the 
judge would determine if the purchaser was a subsequent purchaser 
of preferred stock without any ability to negotiate terms in 
situations where the initial price might have been inaccurate due to 
other non-contractual protections that made the preferred 
stockholder confident in the investment, even without protection 
against reckless investment.  
 
 Would issuers of preferred stock in this narrow group of 
settings (not the VC context, etc.) react to such a rule by contracting 
around it because its addition would add to transaction costs or fail 
to maximize value? It would seem that if the board wishes to retain 
the ability to pursue investments that would considered reckless 
when considered in an objective fashion and would only be 
considered to have a positive value when considered solely from the 
perspective of the common stock, the issuer should be bound by a 
default rule of limited fiduciary protection against reckless 
 Page 77 
investment or the issuer should have to opt out and have to disclose 
to preferred investors who lack bargaining power that the board 
intends to retain the power to (1) intentionally screw the preferred 
wherever possible and to siphon off value from the preferred from 
the start in order to benefit the common and (2) to retain the right to 
act recklessly and to pursue investments that would be considered 
irrational except when viewed from the point of view of the 
common stock alone. Failure to do so in certain settings would lead 
to the application of this limited right of fiduciary protection. 
Of course, perhaps there is no need for a fiduciary duty to 
the preferred from taking reckless behavior because the action by 
the board in acting recklessly to pursue a negative valuation 
opportunity might be actionable under a derivative action. 
The suggestion in this Article that there should be a limited 
fiduciary protection for the preferred in the narrow settings where 
the ability of the preferred to bargain for contractual protections is 
non-existent focuses in effect proposes an approach that depends on 
judges making case by case determinations as to whether fiduciary 
review is appropriate. Such case by case determinations may add to 
expense since there could be uncertainty engendered by such 
judicial decisions and one might consider whether a legislative 
solution would be feasible as a less costly alternative. However, the 
entire argument denying protection for preferred is built on the 
assumption that the preferred can and so arrange either for 
contractual protections or a variety of other alternative private 
mechanisms for protection such as staged financing or board 
control. What this Article suggests is that context matters and there 
are categories of cases outside the VC or other specialty contexts 
where the barriers to negotiating contractual protections are much 
more substantial. That determination seems to be one that inevitably 
demands the fine-grained expertise of courts in assessing the 
bargaining power of the preferred to negotiate contractual 
protections and would seem ill-suited to a legislative solution since 
it would be difficult to identify the context that suggests a departure 




 For decades commentators have debated whether courts 
should imply protection to the preferred that goes beyond their 
contractually negotiated protections and beyond the scope of the 
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fiduciary protections owed to all stockholders. This Article argues 
that the traditional rule limiting preferred to their contractual 
protections makes sense in certain contexts such as venture capital. 
An implied protection would not be value maximizing or cost 
minimizing. First, since venture capitalists and certain other 
preferred stockholders can bargain for contractual protection or 
arrange alternative private strategies, there is reason to suppose that 
the lack of protections is an “omission.” Second, where an agent 
such as the board represents multiple constituencies, the agent will 
take steps from time to time that will advantage one claimant and 
disadvantage another. So long as the wealth shifting is anticipated 
and can be bargained against by the adversely affected claimant, the 
law should not intervene. Doing so would upset the risk allocation 
of the parties and would likely add to costs of the exchange. 
However, in certain limited contexts where the preferred do not 
have the opportunity to negotiate any of the contract terms, either 
because it occurs in the context of a gift of preferred stock or in the 
context of public preferred stock bought subsequent to the initial 
issuance. This context is one in which we can no longer be certain 
that the preferred can anticipate or negotiate for protections against 
wealth shifting to the common. Moreover, if the extra protection is 
limited to constraining intentional destruction of the preferred or 
against reckless investment, then the benefits of encouraging 
investment by investors who would be chilled by a contrary result. 
Common stockholders should be bound by such a default rule or opt 
out and thereby signal that its board will retain the right to 
intentionally destroy the preferred’s value or pursue investments 
that would be considered irrational except when considered solely 
from the perspective of the common stockholder. Additionally, 
because the initial preferred stockholder could protect its interests 
through staged financing or board control, the initial preferred 
stockholder might not discount the stock even if it lacked protection 
since the other protective devices made the lack of such protections 
inconsequential. But to the subsequent purchaser, the lack of such 
protections for subsequent purchasers of the preferred stock might 
call for a limited fiduciary duty.  Finally, because VC’s routinely 
provide for additional terms in shareholder agreements with 
founders that are almost never found in the Charter documents, 
those provisions won’t be transferable. The initial holders of the 
preferred stock (the VC’s) have other protections that render 
fiduciary duties superfluous so the initial holders won’t pay for 
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these added fiduciary protections. But if the markets for preferred 
stock are not as efficient as for common stock or if there are chinks 
in the efficient capital market hypothesis, then the disciplining 
effects of the market are weaker. Thus, subsequent buyers of the 
preferred stock may not price the stock accurately to reflect the lack 
of transferable protections, providing a justification for a limited 
fiduciary duty in that context since implying the term would add 
value.  
 
These may be the cases where maximizing the value of the 
common will not maximize the value of the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
